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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)' gov-
erns the relationship between employers and employees in the
United States.2 Specifically, section 7 of the Act 3 defines the basic
rights of employees and section 8(a)4 defines employer unfair labor
practices. Section 8(a)(1) generally proscribes employers from in-
terfering with employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.' Thus,
many unfair labor practice cases turn on whether section 7 of the
Act protects the employee activity.6 Section 7 protects "concerted
activities" engaged in "for the purpose of collective bargaining or
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. See id. § 151 (declaration of United States labor relations policy); see also § 1(b) of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which amended the NLRA:
It is the purpose and policy of this [Act], in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing
the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights
of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities af-
fect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management
which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights
of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in Section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
4. Section 8(a) states in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor or-
ganization or to contribute financial or other support to it... ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
5. Id. § 158(a)(1); see supra note 4.
6. See generally Note, The Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro and the Doctrine of Con-
structive Concerted Activity-ARO, Inc. v. NLRB Leaves Non-Union Employees at the
Mercy of Their Bosses, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 1045, 1051-53 (1980) (noting role of NLRB and
courts to interpret scope of § 7).
1296
1985] CONSTRUCTIVE CONCERTED ACTIVITIES 1297
other mutual aid or protection."'7 Courts frequently struggle to de-
termine whether given employee activities with which an employer
has interfered are "concerted activities."'8 This determination is
particularly difficult when one employee acts alone instead of with
other employees.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)
formally announced the doctrine of constructive concerted activi-
ties 9 in 1966 in Interboro Contractors, Inc.10 Under this doctrine
an individual employee's attempt to enforce a provision of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is "concerted activity" even if the at-
tempt does not contemplate group action." During the years since
the Board promulgated the Interboro doctrine, the circuit courts
split on the issue of whether and in what circumstances individual
activity could constitute concerted activity.12 The Supreme Court
recently resolved the conflict by approving the Interboro doctrine
in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. 3 Although the Interboro
doctrine is theoretically inapplicable in a nonunion context, 4 the
Board established a collateral doctrine in 1975 in Alleluia Cushion
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 3 for the full text of § 7.
8. See generally Johnson, Protected Concerted Activity in the Non-Union Context:
Limitations on the Employer's Rights to Discipline or Discharge Employees, 49 Miss. L.J.
839, 851 (1978) ("[T]he determination of concerted status is the threshold question upon
which federal statutory protection hinges.").
9. As used in this Recent Development, actual concerted activities would be those ac-
tivities in which more than one employee engages, while constructive concerted activities
would be those activities in which an individual employee engages that nonetheless fall
within the meaning of § 7.
10. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966) (2-1 decision), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
11. See id. at 1298; 388 F.2d at 500.
12. See infra notes 31-69 and accompanying text.
13. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (5-4 decision), rev'g 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam), rev'g 256 N.L.R.B. 451 (1981).
14. Because the Interboro doctrine provides that an individual's activity to enforce
provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement is concerted activity, the doctrine
would appear to be inapplicable in situations in which there is no collective bargaining
agreement. Courts, nonetheless, have applied the doctrine of constructive concerted activity
to unionized companies in which there is no existing collective bargaining agreement. See,
e.g, Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328 (8th Cir. 1978) (absence of a collective
bargaining agreement in a union context did not render an employee's threat to file a griev-
ance unprotected by § 7 of the NLRA); NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (applying Interboro in union context despite absence of a collective bar-
gaining agreement). Most courts, however, have declined to extend the doctrine in the ab-
sence of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no foundation for constructive concerted activ-
ity in absence of collective bargaining agreement); Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153
(5th Cir. 1980) (individual employee's activities do not have the requisite effect on other
employees essential to the Interboro standard absent a collective bargaining agreement).
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Co.1" In Alleluia Cushion the Board held that individual activity
seeking to enforce statutory occupational safety rights was con-
certed activity absent a showing that other employees disavowed
the activity.16 No circuit court ever approved the Alleluia Cushion
doctrine and the Board recently overruled it in Meyers
Industries.
7
This Recent Development examines the doctrine of construc-
tive concerted activities in union and nonunion contexts in light of
both the Supreme Court's approval of the Interboro doctrine and
the NLRB's rejection of Alleluia Cushion. Part II traces the his-
tory of NLRB and circuit court application of the constructive
concerted activities doctrine in union and nonunion contexts. Part
III discusses the City Disposal and Meyers Industries decisions.
Part IV analyzes these decisions individually and conjuctively and
examines the ramifications of the current "definition" of individual
concerted activities. Finally, part IV of this Recent Development
argues that the two decisions together result in an inconsistent ap-
plication of section 7 protection to individual "concerted" activi-
ties and suggests a consolidated City Disposal-Alleluia Cushion
analysis for constructive concerted activities issues in both union
and nonunion settings.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constructive Concerted Activities in the Union Context
1. The Interboro Doctrine
Section 7 of the NLRA protects "concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
15. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
16. Id. at 1000.
17. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (3-1 decision), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Meyers In-
dustries on the grounds that the Board "misconstrued the bounds" of § 7, 755 F.2d at 942,
and that the Board's decision lacked an adequate rationale, id. at 948. The court, however,
did not express an opinion on the correct definition of "concerted activities," id. at 942, 948
n.46, 956, 957, but remanded the case for the Board's reconsideration. This Recent Develop-
ment focuses on the Board's decision and analysis in Meyers Industries despite the D.C.
Circuit's reversal because the D.C. Circuit's discussion of "concerted activities" was only
dicta, the NLRB has continued to employ the Meyers Industries test, the Board is sched-
uled to reconsider Meyers Industries late in 1985 or early in 1986, and on remand the Board
may adhere to its holding in Meyers. See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the D.C. Circuit's opinion. See also infra note 215 for Board decisions that
continue to apply Meyers Industries after the D.C. Circuit reversal.
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tion."1 In early cases decided under the NLRA the Board and the
courts required at least two employees acting together to find con-
certed activity.19 In 1960 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit inferred concerted activity when employees dis-
cussed among themselves their complaints about a new foreman
but complained individually to management.20 The Board actually
formulated what is known as the Interboro doctrine in 1962 in
Bunney Brothers Construction Co.2 In Bunney Brothers the
Board held that section 7 of the NLRA protected as concerted ac-
tivity an individual employee's assertion of a claim arising from a
collective bargaining agreement.2
Although Bunney Brothers stated the essence of the construc-
tive concerted activity doctrine, courts and commentators associate
the origin of the doctrine with Interboro Contractors, Inc.2  This
doctrine, which has spawned so much controversy, ironically
originated as dictum in a two to one Board decision.24 In Interboro
18. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). For the full text of § 7, see supra note 3.
19. See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949) ("con-
certed activities" not requiring union or other formal organization, but employees "acting
together for mutual aid or protection"); see also 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 7.53, at 397
(1969) ("[T]he Board has uniformly held that there must be two or more employees engaged
in [concerted] activity."). See generally Note, The Requirement of "Concerted" Action
Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 516 (1953) (declaring that "[tihe decisions indi-
cate that an act, to be concerted, need only be motivated by a common purpose or commu-
nity of interest shared by at least two employees") (emphasis added).
20. NLRB v.Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). The
court stated:
The mere fact that the men did not formally choose a spokesman or that they did not
go together to see ... [their manager] does not negative concert of action. It is suffi-
cient to constitute concert of action if from all of the facts and circumstances in the
case a reasonable inference can be drawn that the men involved considered that they
had a grievance and decided, among themselves, that they would take it up with
management.
Id. at 12.
21. 139 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1962).
22. Id. at 1519. The Board concluded that in asserting a claim under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the employee "sought to implement the collective-bargain-
ing agreement applicable to him as well as other drivers and ... the implementation of
such an agreement by an employee is but an extension of the concerted activity giving rise
to that agreement." Id.
Interestingly, this precursor to the Interboro doctrine appears to reach farther than
Interboro itself. Bunney Brothers arose in a contractor-subcontractor context. The dis-
charged employee worked for the subcontractor, Bunney Brothers. The relevant collective
bargaining agreement was between the contractor (Western) and the Teamsters. Although
the Teamsters had not organized the Bunney Brothers employees, the Board concluded that
the Teamsters' agreement governed Bunney, too. See id. at 1516-19.
23. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966) (2-1 decision), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
24. See Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298, 1305.
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an employer discharged two employees for complaining about an
alleged violation of certain working condition provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.25 The Board held that the employees
had engaged in protected concerted activities, but noted that the
assertion of collective bargaining agreement provisions would have
been concerted even if one of the employees had acted alone.2 6 Ac-
cording to the Board, "complaints made for such purposes are
grievances within the framework of the contract that affect the
rights of all employees in the unit, and thus constitute concerted
activity which is protected by Section 7 of the Act. '27 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the
Board's decision and order,28  agreeing that individual activity
aimed at enforcing existing collective bargaining agreement provi-
sions "may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in the
absence of interest by fellow employees." 29 The Second Circuit has
25. The trial examiner recommended dismissing the complaint against Interboro after
concluding that one of the employees alone had voiced the complaints. Id. at 1310 n.15. The
trial examiner asserted further that the employee had acted "not for any legitimate union or
concerted objective but ... for his own personal selfish benefit and aggrandizement." Id. at
1311. The Board disagreed with the trial examiner's findings and asserted that the record
showed three employees had made complaints. The Board went on to posit that even if the
one employee had acted alone, his complaints would constitute protected activity because he
was attempting to enforce provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1298.
The employees had leveled complaints against alleged violations of collective bargaining
agreement provisions ensuring two-man welding teams, payment terms, and various safety
and other standard procedures. The employees also attempted to secure eight-hour days
and expense money. The collective bargaining agreement did not address these last two
alleged rights. The Board, however, maintained that the employees' attempt to obtain bene-
fits not provided for by the collective bargaining agreement did not change the Board's
conclusion. Id. at 1299 n.7.
26. Id. at 1298; see also supra note 25.
27. Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298. The Board appeared to establish an "effect" stan-
dard of constructive concerted activity by emphasizing the effect on other employees' rights
rather than a purpose of protecting those rights. The Board did not address expressly the
§ 7 requirement that the "concerted activity" be "for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). Rather, the
Board implied that the assertion of contract rights constituted an extension of the collective
bargaining process. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Other circuits have construed Interboro as an "effect" test. See, e.g., Anchortank, Inc. v.
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513
F.2d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975). But see Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Concerted
Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNEL L. REv. 369, 384-85 (1983)
(arguing that subsequent applications of an "effect" test were misapplications of Interboro).
28. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
29. Id. at 500. Although the Second Circuit agreed with the Board's decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated the holding as a possibility, not as a certainty, and emphasized purpose
rather than effect. See supra note 27. The court stated that "[e]ven if it were true that [the
employee] was acting for his personal benefit, it is doubtful that a selfish motive negates the
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continued to uphold the Interboro doctrine.30
Two other circuits have accepted the Interboro analysis. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has em-
ployed the doctrine of constructive concerted activity in a number
of cases.31 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB 32 alluded to the
doctrine of constructive concerted activities in dicta. In Roadway
Express, Inc. v. NLRB 33 the Fourth Circuit actually approved the
doctrine, without opinion, by enforcing a Board order.
2. The Ensuing Circuit Court Split
In NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.34 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to re-
fuse to adopt the Interboro doctrine.3 5 The court held that an em-
ployee's attempt to secure holiday pay under a collective bargain-
protection that the Act normally gives to Section 7 rights." 388 F.2d at 499 (emphasis
added).
30. See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980) (dicta); NLRB v.
John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969).
31. The Eighth Circuit employed the Interboro approach to constructive concerted
activity in several cases but never endorsed the Interboro doctrine per se. See, e.g., Keokuk
Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1978) (individual employee threatening
to present a grievance in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement engaged in con-
certed activity); NLRB v. Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
("The requirement of concertedness relates to the end, not the means."); NLRB v. Selwyn
Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970) (individual employee presenting a griev-
ance under the collective bargaining agreement engaged in concerted activity). But cf.
NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1977) (2-1 decision) (refusing to
extend Interboro analysis to a noncollective bargaining agreement context).
32. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1969). The court
stated that "[tihe activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employ-
ees for their mutual aid and protection is as much 'concerted activity' as is ordinary group
activity. The one seldom exists without the other." Id. at 1365.
33. 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976), enforcing mem. 217 N.L.R.B. 278 (1975). The Board,
in its decision and order, held that an individual employee's refusal to drive a truck that he
considered to be unsafe was concerted activity because the existing collective bargaining
agreement gave the employees the right to refuse to drive unsafe trucks. 217 N.L.R.B. at
278-79. Citing Interboro, the Board stated that the employee's complaint was relevant to
the other employees under the bargaining agreement. Id. at 279.
The Fourth Circuit later appeared to back away from its Roadway Express endorse-
ment of Interboro. In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir.
1980), the court indicated that it did not have to "determine in this case whether Interboro
is to be applied in this Circuit" because there was no collective bargaining agreement.
34. 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971) (2-1 decision).
35. Until Northern Metal, 440 F.2d at 881, no circuit court, other than the Second
Circuit, had expressly followed or rejected the Interboro doctrine. In 1970 the Eighth Cir-
cuit applied a constructive concerted activities analysis in Selwyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 217, but
the court did not mention Interboro. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ing agreement was not concerted activity. 6 Instead of following
Interboro, the Third Circuit adhered to a test requiring that indi-
vidual concerted activity be for the purpose of initiating, inducing,
or preparing for group action.3 7 Thus, Northern Metal created the
initial circuit court split over the Interboro doctrine,3 8 which wid-
ened considerably in succeeding years.
The Third Circuit continued to reject the Interboro doctrine
in subsequent cases. In Tri-State Truck Service, Inc. v. NLRB3 9
the court held that two employees who individually refused to
work weekends without time and a half pay were not engaged in
concerted activity because their individual activities did not aim to
induce group action.40 The court noted that two or more employees
are not necessarily acting concertedly when they react to a situa-
tion similarly or take the same courses of action.41 In Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB42 the Third Circuit stated that the
Interboro doctrine did not apply when two employees together had
36. Northern Metal, 440 F.2d at 884-85.
37. Id. at 884. The Third Circuit followed a pre-Interboro Third Circuit decision that
held that an employee's discussions with other employees concerning their rights under the
existing collective bargaining agreement was not concerted activity because there was no
indication of contemplated group action. See Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d
683, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1964). The Third Circuit declared in Mushroom Transportation that
"mere talk" was an individual activity. Id. at 685. According to the court, if "mere talk" did
not contemplate group action, then it probably was "mere 'griping.'" Id.
The Third Circuit also relied on Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.
1967), a pre-Interboro case, in which the Seventh Circuit extended the Mushroom Trans-
portation approach from discussions to other activities. The court held that individual ac-
tivity must have the purpose of preparing for or inducing group activity to be concerted
activity under § 7. Id. at 276. Ironically, a few months after the Third Circuit handed down
the Northern Metal decision, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Interboro doctrine and ex-
tended it to cover a noncollective bargaining agreement situation. See NLRB v. Ben Pekin
Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
38. For in depth discussions of the initial Interboro-Northern Metal split, see Note,
The Interboro Doctrine of "Constructive" Concerted Activity-A Logical Interpretation of
Section 7 of the NLRA or a Legal Fiction?, 7 J. CoRP. L. 75, 84-86 (1981); Comment, Con-
structive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 152 (1972).
39. 616 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision).
40. Id. at 68, 71.
41. Id. at 71. The Tri-State court also noted that an employee discharge and a finding
of protected concerted activity did not automatically require the finding of a § 8(a)(1) viola-
tion. Id. Had the court found concerted activity the court also would have required em-
ployer knowledge of the concerted activity and a causal connection between the activity and
the discharge or discipline for a § 8(a)(1) violation. Id.; see also McLean Trucking Co. v.
NLRB, 689 F.2d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 1980); Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 56
(5th Cir. 1970).
42. 618 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1980).
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refused to work in what they considered to be unsafe conditions. 43
Without invoking the Interboro doctrine, the court found that the
employees had engaged in concerted activity.44 In Frank Briscoe
Inc. v. NLRB4 5 the Third Circuit upheld a Board determination
that employees who filed charges with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission were engaged in concerted activity.46 The
court, however, was careful to point out that the Board had not
based its conclusion on the Interboro doctrine.47
In ARO, Inc. v. NLRB48 the Sixth Circuit allied with the Third
Circuit in rejecting the Interboro doctrine. Stating that the In-
terboro doctrine was an overly expansive reading of NLRA section
7, the court adhered to a modified version of its pre-Interboro test
for constructive concerted activity that required activity with or on
the authority of other employees. 4 9 The Sixth Circuit maintained
this posture by refusing to adopt the Interboro doctrine in a num-
ber of subsequent cases 50 including City Disposal Systems.
5 1
43. Id. at 1017 n.14. The employees were asserting rights under § 14(C) of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, which provided that employees who believed their working con-
ditions were abnormally unhealthy or unsafe could refuse to work without losing their right
to return to their jobs. Id. at 1012.
44. Id. at 1017.
45. 637 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981) (2-1 decision).
46. Id. at 949.
47. Id. at 949 & n.4. The court adhered to Wheeling-Pittsburgh, Tri-State, and
Northern Metal, and to the "contemplated group action" test for concerted activity the
court announced in Mushroom Transportation. Id.; see supra note 37.
48. 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
49. Id. at 717. The Sixth Circuit indicated later in its opinion that an individual com-
plaint or claim could be concerted activity if the employee acted as a representative for or
on behalf of other employees or if the employee acted "with the object of inducing or pre-
paring for group action," and the claim or complaint had "some arguable basis in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." Id. at 718.
The court had adopted the first prong of this test in NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum
Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). See Note, supra note 6, at 1063-67 (discussing
Sixth Circuit's retention in ARO of its narrow Guernsey-Muskingum test); see also supra
note 20 and accompanying text. The second prong appears identical to the Third Circuit's
standard in Mushroom Transportation, 330 F.2d at 684-85. See supra note 37 and accom-
panying text. In formulating the second prong, however, the ARO court did not cite Mush-
room Transportation or any other authority as support. 596 F.2d at 718.
50. See Bay-Wood Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(individual employee who complained about unsafe working conditions but did not file a
grievance as provided in the collective bargaining agreement was acting on his own behalf
and was not engaged in concerted activity); cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605
(6th Cir. 1982) (2-1 decision) (individual employee who, with union support, refused to drive
a truck he considered unsafe was engaged in concerted activity). In McLean the court delin-
eated three factors relevant to the determination of whether an individual activity was
concerted:
(1) the substance of the employee's activity--did he act alone, without union advice or
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit like-
wise rejected the Interboro doctrine in a series of cases. The court
initially declined to apply the Interboro doctrine in Buddies Su-
permarkets.52 Although the court stated in Buddies Supermarkets
that Interboro was not applicable because there was no collective
bargaining agreement,53 subsequent opinions used the Buddies Su-
permarkets "rejection" as support for nonacceptance of the doc-
trine. 4 After the reorganization of the Fifth Circuit, the United
did he seek to involve and inform other employees; (2) the degree of union involvement
in and concern with the dispute-was a grievance filed, were union officials notified; (3)
the subject of the complaint-did it have at least an arguable basis in the collective
bargaining agreement or was it merely a personal dispute.
Id. at 609.
51. 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (5-4 deci-
sion); see infra notes 91-143 and accompanying text.
52. 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Note, supra note 6, at 1063-70.
53. 481 F.2d at 719. The court stated that "regardless of our analysis of Interboro the
result remains the same." Id.
54. See, e.g., NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1981); Scooba Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1706 (1984). In
Datapoint the court cited Buddies Supermarkets and adopted the Mushroom Transporta-
tion standard, which requires contemplation of group action. 642 F.2d at 128-29; see supra
note 37 (Mushroom Transporation test). Like the situation in Buddies Supermarkets, un-
ions had not organized the employees of Datapoint and Scooba. The Fifth Circuit, however,
did not base its rejection of the constructive concerted activity doctrine on the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Datapoint court expressed its rationale by declaring-
[W]e would not overrule Buddies Supermarkets even if we could do so. The Board
asks us to set too far-reaching a precedent, one by which virtually any action taken by
a single employee in any way related to wages, hours or the terms and conditions of
employment would be considered protected concerted activity. If Congress had in-
tended Section 7 to be used so broadly, it certainly could have done so with much more
definite language, and courts would have discovered that intent long ago.
642 F.2d at 129.
But see Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980). In Anchortank an
employee requested union representation at an investigatory interview with his employer.
Id. at 1156. At the time of the employee's request, the union had been elected but neither
certified nor voluntarily recognized. Id. The Fifth Circuit implied in dicta that Interboro
might have become an accepted doctrine as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), which the court said weakened the Bud-
dies Supermarkets precedent. 618 F.2d at 1161. In Weingarten the Supreme Court held
that an individual employee had engaged in concerted activity under § 7 when he requested
a union representative to be present at an investigatory meeting the employer conducted.
420 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court said that even though only the one employee had an
immediate stake in the outcome of his request for the presence of a union representative,
[H]e seeks "aid or protection" against a perceived threat to his employment security.
The union representative whose participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not
only the particular employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or con-
tinue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly. The representative's presence is an
assurance to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain his aid
and protection if called upon to attend a like interview.
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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the In-
terboro doctrine in Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB.5 5 The Elev-
enth Circuit noted that it was bound by the decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 6 which had declined to accept the
Interboro doctrine.57 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a rule re-
quiring individual concerted activity "to initiate, induce, or pre-
pare for group action or relate to group action in the interest of
other employees.
5 8
Two other circuits originally accepting the Interboro doctrine
abandoned it in subsequent cases. The Seventh Circuit initially
agreed with the Second Circuit's holding in Interboro and even ap-
plied the doctrine to a situation in which there was a certified
union but no collective bargaining agreement.59 In a later case in-
volving an existing bargaining agreement, however, the court used
the old collective activity standard rather than Interboro to deter-
mine that an employee's solicitation of support from his fellow em-
ployees for his pending grievance was concerted activity.6 0 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit presumably abandoned the Interboro doctrine.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit agreed in principle with the Interboro
doctrine in C & I Air Conditioning,6' but found insufficient evi-
dence that the employee's complaint was for the purpose of mutual
Id. at 260-61 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court went on to state that the NLRB's
construction of § 7 effectuated the most fundamental purposes of the NLRA. Id. at 261.
The Fifth Circuit, however, declared in Anchortank that Weingarten was not control-
ling because the union was not the certified bargaining representative at the time of the
employee's request. 618 F.2d at 1160. The Fifth Circuit, describing itself as bound by prece-
dent, later declined to recognize either the significance of the Interboro dicta in Anchortank
or any effect of Weingarten on the interpretation of § 7. See Datapoint, 642 F.2d at 129.
55. 700 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 693. Because of the reorganization of the Fifth Circuit in 1981, see Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, §§ 1, 9, 9(1), 9(2), 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1982), the decisions of that circuit court as handed down on or before September 30, 1981,
are binding on the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
57. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
58. Roadway Express, 700 F.2d at 694.
59. NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); see
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
60. The court stated that the activity was concerted because it "'was for the purpose
of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint.'" Dries &
Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1976) (quoting Indiana Gear Works v.
NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967)). In Ben Pekin the court distinguished the case
from Indiana Gear Works on the grounds that the employee's acts in Indiana Gear Works
constituted a public and contemptuous venting of a personal grievance instead of an at-
tempt to secure a benefit for all employees. NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206-07
(7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
61. NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973).
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aid or protection and, thus, did not hold the activity concerted
under Interboro2 In a subsequent case that concerned employee
consultation with a union representative about an overtime pay
dispute, the court found the Interboro doctrine inapplicable be-
cause the employee had involved the union in his activities.0 The
court held the employee's activity to be concerted without resort-
ing to the Interboro "fiction. '64 In 1983 the Ninth Circuit explicitly
rejected the Interboro doctrine in Royal Development Co. v.
NLRB.6 5
While the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia expressed reservations about the Interboro doctrine,6
the D.C. Circuit never rejected the doctrine expressly.17 Dicta in
the D.C. Circuit opinions, however, indicate that the court favors a
more strict interpretation of section 7 than the Interboro doctrine
reflects.
68
By the time City Disposal reached the Supreme Court, the
circuits were divided on the validity of the Interboro doctrine. The
majority of the circuits, however, had rejected the doctrine.6 9
62. Id. The court placed its emphasis not on the "effect" of the activities but on their
"purpose." See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing "purpose" and "effect"
interpretations of the Interboro doctrine).
63. NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980).
64. Id. The court emphasized the employee's resort to union assistance, asserting that
"[o]ur decisions indicate a strong preference that the established grievance procedure be
used to resolve employment disputes, and to hold otherwise would ignore the importance of
the counseling function which the union serves in these matters." Id. For a discussion of the
utility of the grievance arbitration procedure in individual concerted activity cases, see infra
notes 193-98 and accompanying text. See also Callaway, Refurbishing the Grievance Proce-
dure Under Collective Bargaining, 35 LAB. L.J. 481 (1984); Robins, Unfair Dismissal.
Emerging Issues in the Use of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Alternative for the
Nonunion Workforce, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437 (1984).
65. 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983). The court noted that without the Interboro doc-
trine, the employee had not engaged in concerted activity within the ambit of § 7 because he
had acted by and for himself without the union's assistance. Id. Thus, even though rejecting
Interboro, the court emulated the Second Circuit's approach of emphasizing the purpose
rather than the effect of an employee's actions under § 7. See supra notes 27-29 and accom-
panying text.
66. Other circuits have interpreted these reservations as indicating outright rejection
by the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 694 n.9 (11th
Cir. 1983); City Disposal Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1005, 1008 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 1505 (1984). See generally Note, supra note 38, at 86-88.
67. See American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
68. Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931
(1981).
69. To summarize, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits favored the doctrine, and
the rest of the circuits either expressly rejected or otherwise refused to apply it. The First
and Tenth Circuits never actually ruled on the doctrine. But cf. NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc.,
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B. Constructive Concerted Activities in the Nonunion Context:
The Alleluia Cushion Doctrine
The Interboro doctrine technically is not applicable in the
nonunion context because of the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement.70 The NLRB, nonetheless, propounded a constructive
concerted activity doctrine for nonunion settings in 1975 in Alle-
luia Cushion Co. 71 The employee in Alleluia Cushion complained
about alleged employer safety violations and without the assistance
or express consent of other employees, filed complaints with the
California Occupational Safety and Health Agency. 2 The Board
found that the employee had engaged in concerted activities be-
cause all employees were concerned with occupational health and
safety.
73
No circuit adopted the Alleluia Cushion doctrine and two cir-
cuits expressly rejected it. 74 Despite this lack of support from the
circuit courts, the Board, awaiting Supreme Court resolution of the
issue,7 5 continued to apply the doctrine in succeeding cases.76 The
566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977) (individual employee's solicitation of support from fellow em-
ployees for a work stoppage held concerted); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513
F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1975) (individual employee's expression of interest in unionization held
concerted because the employee had the welfare of other employees in mind).
70. See supra note 14. The NLRA itself protects employees in both unionized and
nonunionized organizations. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
71. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
72. Id. at 999.
73. Id. at 1000. The Board stated that "where an employee ... seeks to enforce statu-
tory provisions relating to occupational safety designed for the benefit of all employees, in
the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find
an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted." Id. The Board sup-
ported its finding further by noting that the nature and extent of the safety complaints the
employee filed indicated that his concern was not only for himself but also for his fellow
employees. Id. at 1000-01. Thus, the Board found the mere assertion of statutory rights in
the nonunion context constructively concerted, as it had found the assertion of collective
bargaining agreement rights in the union context in Interboro.
74. In 1977 the Eighth Circuit rejected the Alleluia Cushion doctrine in NLRB v.
Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit rejected the
doctrine in 1980 in NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980). See also
Bohlander, Employee Protected Concerted Activity: The Nonunion Setting, 33 LAB. L.J.
344, 346-47 (1982). Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, without mentioning the Alleluia
Cushion doctrine, have held an individual employee's complaints about certain terms and
conditions of employment not to be concerted activities. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp.
v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980) (employee's refusal to forego workers compensation
claim not concerted activity); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1980)
(employee's complaints about job risks and overtime not concerted activity).
75. See Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 28, 252
N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 (1980) ("[W]e respectfully decline to adopt the Ninth Circuit's rejec-
tion of that [Alleluia Cushion] principle until such time as the Supreme Court may deter-
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Board applied the Alleluia Cushion doctrine in cases concerning
employee complaints about job safety, 77 unhealthy working condi-
tions, 7s and sex discrimination." The Board also applied the doc-
trine in cases in which an employee acted out of concern over pay-
roll funds and payments, 0  when an employee filed an
unemployment compensation claim,"' and when an employee filed
a grievance for denial of seniority rights and alleged racial
discrimination."2
Thus, in cases following Alleluia Cushion but preceding Mey-
ers Industries3 the Board applied the Alleluia Cushion doctrine
mine the issue.").
76. The Board's adherence to Alleluia Cushion was adamant. The Board repeatedly
cited its decision in NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, enforcement denied,
566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977), as support for later Alleluia Cushion cases, despite the
Eighth Circuit's express rejection of Alleluia Cushion in its Dawson Cabinet opinion. See,
e.g., Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39, 40 (1978); General Teamsters Local Union No. 528,
237 N.L.R.B. 258, 261 (1978). The Board likewise continued to apply Alleluia Cushion after
the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected it. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders
Union, Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124, 1124 (1980).
77. Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978) (employee refused to drive a truck that
had defective brakes).
78. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 232 N.L.R.B. 920 (1977) (employee complained about
lint and dust in laundry work area).
79. Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290 (employee filed a sex discrimination com-
plaint with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor), enforcement denied,
566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977); Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977)
(employee wrote a letter to corporate officials protesting "racism, sexism, and favoritism");
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1980)
(employee filed a sex discrimination complaint with the California Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission).
80. Ambulance Serv. of New Bedford, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 106 (1977) (employee de-
manded payment in cash because of repeated difficulties cashing employer's payroll checks);
Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977) (2-1 decision) (employee inquired at employer's
bank whether employer had sufficient funds to cover upcoming payroll distribution).
81. Self Cycle & Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75 (1978). The Board found con-
certed the employee's claim for unemployment compensation benefits for a period during
which she was laid off. Id. at 75. The Board asserted that it was attempting to effectuate the
whole scheme of national labor policy, which included unemployment benefits. Id. at 75 &
nn.1-3. The Board noted also that the employee-employer dispute over such a claim was a
matter of common interest to the other employees. Id. at 75-76.
82. General Teamsters Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978). The Board af-
firmed the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that both the employee's
grievance concerning denial of seniority and the employee's racial discrimination complaint
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission constituted concerted activities. Id. at
260. In his opinion and recommended order, the ALJ noted that "the right of employees to
be free from racial discrimination by an employer or union must be accorded the same pri-
macy and protection as the right to safe working conditions" and that the Board generally
recognizes the "purposes of other legislation and [construes] the Act in a manner supportive
of other statutory schemes." Id. at 261.
83. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (3-1 decision), rev'd and remanded
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to employee assertions of both statutory and nonstatutory rights.
The NLRB applied Alleluia Cushion to cases in which the em-
ployee complained to a governmental agency 84 and to cases in
which the employee complained only to the employer.8 5 The
Board, as it had done with the Interboro doctrine, began applying
the Alleluia Cushion doctrine in both union and nonunion con-
texts. What began as a doctrine protecting individual employee as-
sertions of statutorily protected occupational health and safety
rights in a nonunion, no collective bargaining agreement context
became a doctrine protecting individual employee assertions of any
claimed right of common interest to fellow employees even in a
union, collective bargaining agreement context.
86
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Both the United States Supreme Court and the NLRB have
decided cases recently that interpret the definition of "concerted
activities" under section 7 of the NLRA differently. The Supreme
Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. s1 resolved the cir-
cuit court split over the Interboro doctrine. In City Disposal the
Court addressed for the first time the question of whether an indi-
vidual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining
agreement constitutes concerted activity within the meaning of
section 7 of the NLRA. The Court held that an individual em-
sub. noma. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision); see infra notes 144-68
and accompanying text.
84. See Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 28, 252
N.L.R.B. 1124 (1980) (California Fair Employment Practices Commission); General Team-
sters Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
85. See Akron Gen. Medical Center, 232 N.L.R.B. at 927 (1977). The Board adopted
the ALJ's opinion, which asserted:
Even though ... [Alleluia Cushion] involved the filing of a complaint with the Cali-
fornia OSHA Office, I see no distinction between that case and the instant case where
the employee complained to the employer rather than to a governmental agency. As in
Alleluia, the complainant herein sought to compel Respondent to comply with stan-
dards concerning occupational safety.
Id.
86. See General Teamsters Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978) (applying
Alleluia Cushion to individual employee's filing of a grievance with the union protesting his
denial of seniority rights); Akron Gen. Medical Center, 232 N.L.R.B. 920, 921 (1977) (apply-
ing Alleluia Cushion to employee's complaint of lint and dust in work area in union-collec-
tive bargaining agreement context). See generally Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and
the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
286, 303-09 (1981) (discussing history of the Alleluia Cushion doctrine).
87. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (5-4 decision).
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ployee's reasonable and honest assertion of a collective bargaining
agreement right is concerted activity."' The NLRB in Meyers In-
dustries, Inc.89 overruled the Alleluia Cushion doctrine. The
Board reverted to a standard requiring that concerted activity be
with or on behalf of other employees, not merely by or on behalf of
an individual employee.90
A. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.
In City Disposal an employee refused to drive a truck he be-
lieved to have defective brakes.91 As a result of this refusal City
Disposal discharged the employee.9 2 Under the existing collective
bargaining agreement between City Disposal and the Teamsters,
employees could refuse to operate unsafe equipment without vio-
lating the bargaining agreement, if the employees could justify
their refusals.9 The employee then filed a charge alleging that the
employer had committed a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice.
After the initial hearing the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) con-
cluded that, absent a showing that the employee's complaint was
not "honestly held, '94 his refusal to drive the truck constituted
concerted activity.95 The NLRB summarily affirmed the ALJ's
88. Id. at 1516.
89. 268 N.L.R.B. 493, rev'd and remanded sub. noma. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(1985).
90. Id. at 495-96.
91. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1509. The employee did not expressly invoke the rele-
vant bargaining agreement provision to support his refusal.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1507-08. Article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement provided:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any
vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appliances pre-
scribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to
operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
Id. Article XXI also provided that "[tihe Employer shall not ask or require any employee to
take out equipment that has been reported by any other employee as being in an unsafe
operating condition until same has been approved as being safe by the mechanical depart-
ment." Id. at 1508 n.1.
94. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 451, 454 (1981) (quoting United Parcel Serv.,
241 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1077 (1979), enforcement denied sub. nom. Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d
173 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), enforcement denied, 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
1505 (1984). The ALJ relied upon Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278 (1975), enforced
mem., 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
95. City Disposal, 256 N.L.R.B. at 454. The AIJ also cited the Board's decision in
McLean Trucking Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 728 (1980), enforced, 689 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1982) (2-1
decision), as support for the "honestly held" belief requirement. United Parcel had required
that an employee's invocation of collective bargaining rights must be "honestly held." 241
N.L.R.B. at 1077. McLean Trucking had required that the employee's assertion be "hon-
estly and reasonably believed." 252 N.L.R.B. at 733; see also NLRB v. John Langenbacher
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finding in favor of the discharged employee. On appeal the Sixth
Circuit reversed, adhering to its ARO concertedness standard,96
which requires activity on behalf of other employees or at least
with the object of preparing for or inducing group action.9 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding in a
five to four decision.98 The Court defined its task as determining
whether the Board's interpretation and application of section 7
were reasonable.9  In making this determination, the Court noted
that neither City Disposal nor the Sixth Circuit denied that an in-
dividual employee's invocation of a collective bargaining agreement
right satisfied the requirement that the action be "for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 100 Ac-
cording to the Court, the disagreement between the Board and the
Sixth Circuit concerned the definition of "concerted activities."
Recognizing that the Act does not define "concerted activities," the
Court asserted that the term clearly includes activities of employ-
ees who have united to further common goals.101 The Court, there-
fore, set out to articulate "the precise manner in which particular
Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968) (requiring a "reasonable basis" for an employee's inter-
pretation of a collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969). In both
United Parcel and McLean Trucking the relevant collective bargaining agreement provi-
sions contained the exception for unjustified refusals. Apparently, the collective bargaining
agreement language has been the primary source of the "honestly held" or justifiable belief
requirement. Neither circuit court opinion discussed the employee's belief, but focused on
the issue of concertedness. In McLean the Sixth Circuit discussed the justifiable refusal
language, but did so in rejecting the employer's contention that the employees violated the
collective bargaining agreement by unjustifiably refusing to drive vehicles that were safe.
689 F.2d at 611.
96. See ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
97. 683 F.2d 1005, 1007 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984); see
supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (tracing Sixth Circuit's treatment of the Interboro
doctrine).
98. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the majority, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
99. 104 S. Ct. at 1510. The Court declined to waive the normal standard of review and
deferred to the Board's expertise, even though the case presented the Court with a question
fundamental to the scope and coverage of the Act. Id. at 1510 n.7. The Court referred to
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), stating that "we have not hesitated to defer
to the Board's interpretation of the Act in the context of issues substantially similar to that
presented here." Id. In Weingarten the Court approved the Board's construction of § 7
"concerted activities" to cover an individual employee's request for union representation at
an investigatory interview the employer conducted. See supra note 54 (discussing the effect
of Weingarten on the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the Interboro doctrine); infra note 184 (dis-
cussing separate issue of union or co-employee representation at employee interview).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 1510.
101. Id. at 1511. The Court cited the Board's decision in Meyers Industries for this
proposition. See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
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actions of an individual employee must be linked to the actions of
fellow employees" to constitute concerted activities.
10 2
The majority began its analysis with a discussion of the In-
terboro doctrine. The Court noted the dual underpinnings of the
constructive concerted activity doctrine: (1) that the assertion of a
collective bargaining agreement right is an extension of the con-
certed activity that gave rise to the agreement, and (2) that this
assertion affects all employees covered by the agreement. 0 3 The
Court characterized the collective bargaining process, including the
organization of the bargaining unit, collective negotiations, and im-
plementation of the resulting agreement, as one collective activ-
ity.10 4 The Court said, further, that the individual employee could
not assert his rights without the preceding collective bargaining
steps and that collective bargaining itself would be useless without
the individual employee's right to enforce the agreement.10 5 The
Court concurred with the second principle underlying the In-
terboro doctrine by concluding that an employee asserting a collec-
tive bargaining right does not act alone, but rather "brings to bear
on his employer the power and resolve of all his fellow
employees."106
102. 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
103. Id. at 1510-11. The first principle originated in Bunney Brothers, and the second
principle had its roots in Interboro. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (extension of
collective bargaining agreement); see also supra text accompanying note 27 (rights of all
employees affected).
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1511. The Court cited Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), in which
it had characterized collective bargaining as a "continuing process" involving "the protec-
tion of employee rights already secured by contract." 355 U.S. at 46.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 1511. The Court seemed to imply that the collective bargaining
agreement would be ineffective if an individual employee could not enforce the provisions of
the agreement without union assistance. A collective bargaining agreement, however, usually
establishes a procedure for enforcement of the mutual duties and obligations that the agree-
ment secures. The most common mechanism for self-enforcement is the grievance arbitra-
tion process. See J. ATELSON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN & E. SILVERSTmN, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 459 (2d ed. 1984) ("A study by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics has revealed that 99 percent of 1,717 major contracts provided for a griev-
ance procedure.").
106. 104 S. Ct. at 1511. Applying this statement to the facts in City Disposal, the
Court stated:
When, for instance, James Brown refused to drive a truck he believed to be unsafe, he
was in effect reminding his employer that he and his fellow employees, at the time
their collective-bargaining agreement was signed, had extracted a promise from City
Disposal that they would not be asked to drive unsafe trucks . . . . [and] that if it
persisted in ordering him to drive an unsafe truck, he could reharness the power of that
group to ensure the enforcement of that promise. It was just as though James Brown
was reassembling his fellow union members to reenact their decision not to drive un-
safe trucks.
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The Court next analyzed the language of section 7. The Court
observed that Congress had deemed employees' individual actions
in joining or assisting labor organizations to be concerted activities
because of "the integral relationship among the employees' ac-
tions. ' 107 The Court said there was an analogous integral relation-
ship between the collective bargaining activity and the individual
assertion of collective rights. The Court asserted that in each case,
neither the group nor the individual activity would be meaningful
without the other. 08
The Court continued by asserting that the Interboro doctrine
was consistent with the objectives of the NLRA.10 9 Admitting that
neither the Act nor its legislative history clarifies the meaning of
"concerted activities," the Court asserted that the general history
of section 7 indicates that the Interboro doctrine is consistent with
the intent of the Act. 110 The Court provided no express support for
its proposition that Congress intended to provide equal bargaining
power between individual employees and employers, but relied
simply on the absence of contrary evidence.' Specifically, the
Court asserted that there was "no indication that Congress in-
tended to limit this [section 7] protection to situations in which an
employee's activity and that of his fellow employees combine with
one another in any particular way ... [or] to have this general
protection withdrawn in situations in which a single employee, act-




107. Id. at 1512. The Court had noted, in an earlier footnote, that because § 7 referred
to "other concerted activities," the forming, joining, and assisting of labor organizations
were deemed to be concerted activities already enumerated in § 7. Id. at 1511 n.8; see supra
note 3 for the full text of § 7.
108. Id. at 1512. In a footnote, the Court conceded that "at some point an individual
employee's actions may become so remotely related to the activities of fellow employees that
it cannot reasonably be said that the employee is engaged in concerted activity." Id. at n.10.
As an illustration the Court cited Capitol Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 851 (1980) (employee's "griping" about the condition of the employees' road and
parking lot not concerted activity).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 1512.
110. Id. at 1512-13. The Court emphasized that equalization of bargaining power be-
tween the employer and the employees was the general intent of the Act. Commentators
also have struggled with the frustrating lack of legislative history. See Note, supra note 62,
at 376-77 & n.40.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 1513.
112. Id. The Court summarized by stating that Congress did intend "to create an
equality in bargaining power between the employer and the employee throughout the entire
process of labor organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-bargaining
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The Court next considered the role of the grievance procedure
in employee collective bargaining agreement enforcement. The
Court noted both the importance of the grievance mechanism and
the inherently concerted nature of processing a grievance according
to the provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement.11
The Court said that there is little practical difference between an
employee's grievance, complaint to his employer, or refusal to per-
form work. The Court rejected the notion that the availability of a
formal grievance mechanism for dispute resolution precludes sec-
tion 7 protection of other, informal methods of collective rights en-
forcement. 114 The Court concluded by stating that an employee's
refusal to perform duties not required by the collective bargaining
agreement should be deemed concerted activity when the employee
satisfies two requirements. First, the employee must base his con-
duct on a "reasonable and honest belief." Second, the employee





Similarly, the Court rejected City Disposal's argument that
the Interboro doctrine undermines the grievance arbitration pro-
cess. City Disposal contended that, using the Interboro doctrine,
an employee could avoid the arbitration process by provoking a
discharge and filing a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice
charge."1 The Court rebuffed this argument on three grounds.
First, an employee intentionally attempting to bypass grievance ar-
bitration by relying on the Interboro doctrine runs the risk that
the NLRB will find "concerted activities" but not protected "con-
certed activities" under section 7.117 Second, the Interboro doctrine
agreements." Id.
113. Id.; see also supra note 64; infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing
grievance mechanisms).
114. 104 S. Ct. at 1513-14. The Court acknowledged that an employee's initial reaction
to a perceived violation of a collective bargaining agreement right would likely be an infor-
mal complaint to the employer. The employee might decide later to file a formal grievance,
depending upon the nature of the infringed right, the employer's response to the initial
complaint, and the existence of a grievance procedure or alternative method of enforcement.
The Court explained that, for various reasons, an employer's infringement of an employee's
collective bargaining agreement rights might not result in the filing of a formal grievance.
Id. at 1514.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. The Court noted that, whenever an employee meets these two
requirements, "there is no justification for overturning the Board's judgment that the em-
ployee is engaged in concerted activity, just as he would have been had he filed a formal
grievance." Id.
116. Id.; see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between § 7 and § 8(a)(1) of the Act).
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1514. The Court recognized the possibility that "concerted activi-
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does not undermine the arbitration process any more than would
the test that the Sixth Circuit had used. City Disposal had argued
in favor of the Sixth Circuit's ARO test, which would classify as
concerted any individual activity on behalf of other employees or
for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action." s Ac-
cording to the Court, an employee acting concertedly under ARO is
"equally well positioned" to invoke the grievance or arbitration
mechanism as an employee acting concertedly under Interboro; the
Interboro doctrine, therefore, no more interferes with the arbitra-
tion process than would the ARO doctrine. 119 Third, the Board al-
ways can defer to an applicable grievance arbitration process when
issues addressed in an unfair labor practice case either were or
could have been raised in arbitration. °2 0 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that the Board's interpretation of section 7 "concerted ac-
tivities" as expressed in the Interboro doctrine poses no inherent
danger to the usefulness of the grievance arbitration mechanism.
Applying the Interboro doctrine to the facts in City Disposal,
the Court held that the employee's reasonable and honest invoca-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement right was concerted activ-
ity.' 2' The Court made this determination over two of City Dispo-
sal's arguments. City Disposal argued, first, that the employee's
ties" might nevertheless fall outside the protective scope of § 7. An employee might lose § 7
protection for otherwise "concerted activities" if such activities are violent or otherwise un-
lawful, see, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), constitute insubordi-
nation, see, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1970);
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 177 (1980), or are disloyal to the employer, see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). See generally Johnson, supra note 8,
at 869-76.
The Court noted that the employer also has the option of negotiating a collective bar-
gaining provision to prohibit certain types of concerted activity. A common example is the
no-strike agreement. Although striking is concerted activity, § 7 protection does not cover
strikes in violation of a no-strike clause. See 104 S. Ct. at 1514; see also Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (no-strike agreement operates as effective waiver of
economic benefit strikes but not as waiver of unfair labor practice strikes).
118. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit's
holding and analysis in ARO, Inc. and its subsequent application).
119. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. The Court correctly noted that both the Interboro and the
ARO doctrines "undermin[e]" the grievance arbitration process. Id. It seems undeniable,
however, that the Interboro doctrine has the potential for greater erosion of the process
than does ARO because Interboro grants employees more opportunities to sidestep the
grievance mechanism.
120. Id. In support of this principle, the Court cited Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) and Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See infra notes 208-
10 and accompanying text (noting the Board's recent return to the broad deferral policies of
Collyer and Spielberg).
121. 104 S. Ct. at 1516. The Court decided only whether the employee's activity was
concerted; the issue whether the activity was also protected was not before the Court. Id.
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refusal to drive the truck was not concerted activity because he did
not base his refusal explicitly on the collective bargaining agree-
ment.122 The Court rejected this contention, stating that: (1) the
NLRB and the courts never have conditioned the applicability of
the Interboro doctrine on an employee's express reference to a col-
lective bargaining agreement right,123 and (2) this condition would
diminish greatly the protection that the doctrine affords to em-
ployees, who often are unversed in collective bargaining agreement
matters.124 City Disposal argued, second, that the language of the
collective bargaining agreement provisions excluding "unjustified"
refusals 12 5 meant that only employee refusals to drive trucks that
were in fact unsafe should be deemed "concerted. 1 2 The Court
declined to express a view on City Disposal's interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement language, stating that the In-
terboro doctrine will deem to be concerted activity "honest and
reasonable invocation[s] of a collectively bargained right . . . re-
gardless of whether the employee turns out to have been correct in
his belief that his right was violated.' 2 7 The Court summarized by
holding that the Interboro doctrine, which "recognizes as con-
certed activity an individual employee's reasonable and honest in-
vocation of a right provided for in his collective-bargaining agree-
122. See supra note 91.
123. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. The Board never has required that an employee refer explic-
itly to an applicable collective bargaining agreement right for Interboro to apply. See Road-
way Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975) (employee's refusal to drive an allegedly
unsafe truck deemed concerted activity despite the fact that "he did not at the time of his
refusal specifically refer to the contract as granting him this right ... "), enforced mem.,
532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976).
124. 104 S. Ct. at 1515. The Court announced a standard for employee articulation of
collective bargaining rights:
As long as the nature of the employee's complaint is reasonably clear to the person to
whom it is communicated, and the complaint does, in fact, refer to a reasonably per-
ceived violation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the complaining employee is
engaged in the process of enforcing that agreement.
Id.
125. See supra note 93 (text of relevant collective bargaining agreement provision).
126. 104 S. Ct. at 1516; see also McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605, 611
(6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting an argument indentical to City Disposal's argument in the instant
case).
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1516. The Court observed that the filing of a grievance is concerted
even if it is not meritorious. The Court, however, noted that the language of the collective
bargaining agreement ultimately controls whether an activity will be protected. If an agree-
ment allows only employee refusals to operate trucks that are in fact unsafe, then neither
the agreement nor § 7 will protect refusals to operate safe trucks. Id.; see supra note 117
and accompanying text (distinction between "concerted" activity and "protected concerted"
activity).
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ment," is a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA and applies to
make the City Disposal employee's individual refusal to drive an
allegedly unsafe truck concerted activity.12
The dissent 129 labeled the Interboro doctrine an "exercise in
undelegated legislative power by the Board."'130 Specifically, the
dissent argued that the Interboro doctrine, in effect, automatically
transforms every employee allegation of an employer collective
bargaining agreement violation into an unfair labor practice
charge. The dissent recognized two problems arising from this
transformation. First, the dissent cited precedent stating that an
alleged employer violation of a collective bargaining agreement
cannot by itself provide adequate grounds for an unfair labor prac-
tice.' In the dissent's view, the Interboro doctrine would allow an
employer's alleged collective bargaining agreement violation to
form the sole basis of a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice com-
plaint. Second, the dissent argued that the doctrine essentially
grants the Board jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreement
disputes and thus violates congressional intent.13 2 The dissent crit-
icized what it termed the extension of the Board's jurisdiction to
"interpreting all contracts" and "resolving all contract disputes."' 33
128. 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
129. Justice O'Connor authored the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. Id. The dissent cited NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) and
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962). In C & C Plywood the Court noted
that Congress did not enact into law a proposed provision of the NLRA that would have
made employer collective bargaining agreement violations unfair labor practices. 385 U.S. at
427 & n.11. In Dowd Box the Court said, "Congress expressly rejected ... the proposal that
such [collective bargaining agreement] violations be made unfair labor practices." 368 U.S.
at 513; see infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
132. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent urged again that Con-
gress intended the Board to have jurisdiction over contractual disputes only when they are
incident to other, independent unfair labor practice claims. The dissent stressed that "Con-
gress expressly decided that, '[o]nce [the] parties have made a collective bargaining con-
tract[,J the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and
not to the ... Board."' Id. (quoting HR. CoNr. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42,
reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1147). Even though the dissent did not refer
to § 130 of the NLRA, that section may provide further evidence of congressional intent to
preempt Board jurisdiction over any employment contract dispute resolution that is not
appurtenant to a separate unfair labor practice claim. Section 130 provides that "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1982).
133. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent's concern that any con-
tract dispute will provide the basis for an unfair labor practice complaint is overblown. Its
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According to the dissent, the majority's willingness to recognize in-
dividual triggering of collective bargaining provisions was particu-
larly disturbing because the Interboro doctrine does not require an
employee to invoke expressly or even to be aware of the relevant
contract right.134 The dissent was dissatisfied with the majority's
reliance on the Board's power to defer to an existing grievance pro-
cess. 13 5 The dissent noted that the Board did not defer to the
grievance process in City Disposal, even though the union had de-
clined to process the employee's grievance for lack of objective
merit.13 6
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the Interboro doctrine was consistent with the purposes of the
NLRA. The dissent stressed that the Act's purpose was not to en-
courage collective bargaining but rather to encourage group activ-
ity. The dissent concluded, therefore, that "[t]he fact that two em-
ployees receive coverage where one acting alone does not is
therefore entirely consistent with the labor laws' emphasis on col-
lective action."13 7 The dissent also disagreed with the majority's ar-
analysis fails to realize that, in many Interboro-type situations, the alleged unfair labor
practice is not the employer's supposed violation of the collective bargaining agreement, but
the employer's discharge of the employee. While the Board should not have primary juris-
diction over the former complaint, it should over the latter. In City Disposal the employee
claimed that City Disposal committed an unfair labor practice by discharging him, not by
violating Article XXI of the collective bargaining agreement, which lay at the heart of the
employer-employee dispute. See City Disposal, 683 F.2d at 1006, 104 S. Ct. at 1508. For the
text of Article XXI of the City Disposal collective bargaining agreement, see supra note 93.
The ultimate resolution of the controversy in City Disposal, as in any firing case, would
concern the substance of the dispute that led to the employee's discharge. A contract dis-
pute, however, would provide the basis for a § 8 charge under the Interboro doctrine only if
the dispute resulted in other employer conduct that offended to § 7 rights.
A discharge could fall, in and of itself, under § 8(a)(1), if a collective bargaining provi-
sion prohibited employee discharge for particular conduct or for certain reasons. In these
cases, the fact that the parties negotiated over the question and provided expressly for it in
their collective bargaining agreement would not, and should not, preclude the Board's
jurisdiction.
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1517 & n.3 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent said: "One would
think that a rule defining 'concerted activity' would require the employee to have some idea
that he is engaging in it." Id. For the majority view, see supra notes 123-24 and accompany-
ing text.
135. Id. at 1517 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For the majority view, see id. at 1515;
see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 1517 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1509). The dissent averred
that the NLRB does not defer to grievance and arbitration procedures consistently. See
infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Board's changing deferral
policies).
137. Id. at 1518 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 370 U.S. 650, 653 (1965)).
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gument that an individual, self-interested assertion of a collective
bargaining agreement right must be concerted because the employ-
ees as a group expressed interest in the right during the contract
negotiation process.138 The dissent criticized this argument for fail-
ing to distinguish between substantive contract rights and the pro-
cedure for their enforcement. According to the dissent, when em-
ployees act together for a mutual cause, whether or not it is based
in the collective bargaining agreement, those actions are "con-
certed activities." When an individual employee acts alone in fur-
therance of a personal cause, whether or not the action is based on
the collective bargaining agreement, the action is not "concerted"
activity. Thus, the dissent postulated that the real question is not
whether the employee's substantive rights will be vindicated, but
rather through which forum or procedure the employee should
seek redress. The dissent argued that "concerted activities" should
be processed through the NLRB's administrative procedures and
that individual activities should be processed through either the
union or the courts."3 9
In conclusion, the dissent stated that the Interboro doctrine
made little sense when applied to the facts in City Disposal. The
dissent found significant the absence of any evidence that the dis-
charged employee discussed the truck with other employees,
warned them about the alleged unsafe conditions, sought the sup-
port or assistance of other employees in the union, or filed a griev-
ance immediately after the incident.140 The dissent, therefore, con-
cluded that the discharged employee had not been engaged in
"concerted" activity and the employer had not violated section
8(a)(1). Although the dissent viewed the Interboro doctrine as an
unreasonable interpretation of section 7, the dissent did not adopt
the position that no individual activity could be "concerted.'
4'
Rather, the dissent postulated that an individual who "acts with or
138. 104 S. Ct. at 1518 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For the majority view, see id. at
1510-12; see also supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 1518 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that "[t]he In-
terboro doctrine is therefore against Congress' judgment as to how contract rights are best
vindicated." Id. at 1519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the employee
"simply asserted that the truck was not safe enough for him to drive." Id. (emphasis in
original). It determined that "[t]he fact that the right asserted can be found in the collective
bargaining agreement may be relevant to whether activity of that type should be 'protected,'
but not to whether it is 'concerted.'" Id.
141. Id. The dissent agreed with the majority that the critical issue concerns the exact
nature of the relationship between the actions of the individual employee and the actions of
the other employees. Id. For the majority view, see id. at 1511.
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expressly on behalf of one of more of the other employees ... [or]
takes action with the proven object of inducing, initiating, or pre-
paring for group action" is engaged in concerted activity.14 2 Thus,
the dissent sided with the circuits that had rejected the Interboro
doctrine and had adopted the ARO test.
143
B. Meyers Industries, Inc.
The Board, in Meyers Industries, Inc.,4 overruled the Alle-
luia Cushion doctrine, a "corollary" to the Interboro doctrine. In
Meyers Industries the Administrative Law Judge had relied on Al-
leluia Cushion and concluded that the employer's discharge of an
employee who refused to drive an unsafe truck after reporting its
condition to a state safety agency was a violation of section
8(a)(1). 145 The Board rejected both the ALJ's conclusions and the
Alleluia Cushion doctrine, returning to a "united-action interpre-
tation of 'concerted activity.' "146
The Board began its opinion by discussing the history of the
Board's interpretation of "concerted activities" prior to Alleluia
Cushion.47 The Board noted that, in pre-Alleluia Cushion deci-
142. Id. at 1519 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit's ARO
test for "concerted activities").
144. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (3-1 decision), rev'd and remanded sub. noma. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision). Members Dotson, Hunter, and Diaz
Dennis comprised the Board's majority.
145. 268 N.L.R.B. at 493. The discharged employee had complained to his employer
on numerous occasions about malfunctions of the truck he drove. The employee experienced
problems primarily with the truck's braking and steering systems. During one of the em-
ployee's many interstate roadtrips from his base in Michigan, he voluntarily stopped for
inspection in Ohio after the brakes malfunctioned. Ohio State roadside inspectors cited the
truck for several defects, including defects in the braking system. On the occasion that gave
rise to the employee's discharge, the defective brakes caused the employee to have an acci-
dent. After this accident the employee notified the Tennessee Public Service Commission,
which inspected the truck, issued a citation for bad brakes, and put the truck out of service
until repaired. Shortly thereafter, the vice president of Meyers discharged the employee,
telling him: "'[W]e can't have you calling the cops like this all the time.'" Id. at 498.
146. Id. at 493. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Board's statement that it was
returning to its pre-Alleluia Cushion standard. Prill, 755 F.2d at 948; see infra notes 172-74
and accompanying text.
147. 268 N.L.R.B. at 493-95. The Board discussed Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313,
1314 (1951) (noting that "the guarantees of Section 7 . . . extend to concerted activity
which in its inception involves only a speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indis-
pensable preliminary step to employee self-organization."); Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B.
380, 388 (1965) (emphasizing the lack of evidence that "there was any consultation between
the two [employees] in the matter, that either relied in any measure on the other in making
his refusal, or that their association . . . was anything but accidental."); and Continental
Mfg., 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 257 (1965) (holding an individual employee's letter unconcerted
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sions, it defined concerted activities "in terms of interaction among
employees. ' 148 The Board next discussed Alleluia Cushion and its
"per se standard" of concerted activity.149 The Board outlined four
reasons for its conclusion that the Alleluia Cushion per se stan-
dard is inconsistent with the NLRA. First, the Board criticized the
Alleluia Cushion doctrine's effect of shifting attention from actual
to hypothetical employee action. °50 Under the Alleluia Cushion
doctrine, instead of finding concerted activity only when employees
took action to pursue a common health and safety concern, the
Board could find concerted activity whenever, because of health
and safety legislation, the employees should have had a common
concern. Second, the Board noted that subsequent Board decisions
exacerbated this defect by extending the doctrine to any situation
in which the employees should have had a common concern, even
when no relevant legislation existed.1 51 Third, the Board objected
to the rule under Alleluia Cushion that required employers to ne-
gate otherwise concerted individual action by showing that other
employees disavowed the discharged employee's action. The major-
ity disapproved of this effective shift of the General Counsel's bur-
den of proof to the employer. 52 Last, the Board cited circuit court
rejection of the per se standard as further grounds for overruling
Alleluia Cushion.15'
The Board next enunciated an "'objective' standard of con-
certed activity," which requires that an individual employee's ac-
tivity "be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees,
and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself."'154 The
because she directed it only to the employer, prepared it alone, did not consult with fellow
employees or the union, and did not intend to enlist the support of other employees or the
union).
148. 268 N.L.R.B. at 494.
149. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing Alleluia Cushion and
the Board's application of the Alleluia Cushion doctrine).
150. 268 N.L.R.B. at 495.
151. Id. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Board's exten-
sion of the scope of the Alleluia Cushion doctrine).
152. 268 N.L.R.B. at 496. The Board quoted the relevant language from Alleluia
Cushion, which provides that the Board will deem concerted individual employee enforce-
ment of a statutory health or safety right "in the absence of any evidence that fellow em-
ployees disavow such representation." Id. (quoting Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000)
(emphasis in original).
153. Id.; see also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court
rejection of Alleluia Cushion).
154. Id. at 496-97 (footnote omitted). Thus, the standard the Board adopted in Mey-
ers Industries is the same as that proposed in Guernsey-Muskingum. 285 F.2d at 12. The
Guernsey-Muskingum standard formed the first prong of the two-part test proposed in
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Board emphasized two effects of the return to an objective stan-
dard. First, the General Counsel must prove all elements of a sec-
tion 8(a)(1) violation, not merely that an individual employee ex-
pressed concern over a matter that constructively concerns all
employees. 155 Second, the determination of whether an individual
employee's activity is "concerted" becomes a fact question requir-
ing full and complete evidence. 156 Applying this objective standard
to the facts in Meyers Industries, the Board held that the dis-
charged employee's refusal to drive an unsafe truck was not con-
certed activity.1
5 7
The majority's ruling drew a stinging dissent from Member
Zimmerman, who criticized the Board's "distortion" of section 7
rights.'5 8 On a number of grounds, the dissent supported a pre-
sumption of concertedness for individual assertions of employ-
ment-related statutory rights. 59 First, the dissent took exception
to the Meyers Industries objective standard and the way it distin-
guishes between concerted and unconcerted activities. The dissent
argued that the determination of whether an employee's assertion
of a statutorily protected right is concerted should not depend ulti-
mately upon whether the employee had been "so omniscient as to
rally other employees to [his] aid in advance.'1 6 0 The dissent ex-
ARO. The dissenting opinion in City Disposal apparently endorsed the Meyers Industries
standard. 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1519 (1984) (O'Connor J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent
said that § 7 "certainly" will hold concerted any activity that satisfies the first prong of the
ARO test, and that "the statutory language can even be stretched" to hold concerted activ-
ity that satisfies the second prong. Id. For further discussion of the ARO two-prong test, see
supra note 49. The D.C. Circuit similarly concluded in Prill that the Meyers Industries
standard was more narrow than the Board's pre-Alleluia Cushion standard. See infra notes
172-74 and accompanying text.
155. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. The Board mentioned four elements of a prima facie
§ 8(a)(1) violation: (1) the employee was engaged in concerted activity as defined under
Meyers Industries; (2) the employer had knowledge of both the employee's activity and its
concerted nature; (3) § 7 protects the concerted activity; and (4) the employee's activity
motivated the employer's reaction. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 498. The Board addressed the sympathies of the case, acknowledging that
"[o]ne might . . . argue that [the employee's] situation is a sympathetic one that should
cause us concern." Id. at 499. The Board stated:
Outraged though we may be by [an employer] who-at the expense of its drivers and
others traveling on the nation's highways-was clearly attempting to squeeze the last
drop of life out of a trailer that had just as clearly given up the ghost, we are not
empowered to correct all immorality or even illegality arising under the total fabric of
Federal and state laws.
Id.
158. Id. (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. The dissent noted the majority's admission "that a solitary over-the-road
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pressed concern about the "safe zone" the Meyers Industries stan-
dard creates for employers by allowing them to retaliate against
employees who complain when they believe the employer is im-
pinging upon their legislatively protected rights.181 Second, the dis-
sent perceived the protection of individual assertions of statutory
rights as being consistent with the history, purposes, and policies
of the NLRA.16 2 The dissent's statutory interpretation of the
NLRA rested largely upon the assumption that an employment-
related statutory right is not an individual but a collective right.6 3
The dissent, therefore, argued that section 7 "concerted activities"
cover the individual assertion of such a right. Last, the dissent
stressed that the Alleluia Cushion presumption of concertedness
was reasonable.1
6 4
The dissent's analysis rested primarily on the equities con-
nected with constructive concerted activity cases. The dissent com-
pared a "literal" concerted activity, such as a group of employees
requesting an increase in wages, with a constructive concerted ac-
truckdriver would be hard pressed to enlist the support of co-workers while away from the
home terminal. Nevertheless, they find this employee unprotected by the Act because no
other employee expressly joined him in lodging the complaint with the Tennessee Commis-
sion." Id.
161. Id. at 503 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissent saw this result as a
direct contravention of the NLRA policy "to guarantee that employees do not lose their jobs
because they challenge an employer on a matter concerning group wages, hours, or terms
and conditions of employment." Id.
162. Id. at 500 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). See generally Note, Individual
Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 991, 998-1014 (1980) (discussing the policies of the NLRA and the
legislative and case history of § 7 concerted activities). Member Zimmerman also noted the
Supreme Court's directive that the Board effectuate the NLRA in accommodation with
other federal legislation. 268 N.L.R.B. at 500 (citing Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
163. 268 N.L.R.B. at 501 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissent said:
It goes against the history and spirit of Federal labor laws to use the concept of con-
certed activity to cut off protection for the individual employee who asserts collective
rights ....
... [[T]he term 'concerted' appears to limit only the assertion of individual rights
which have no relationship to any collective effort to improve working conditions or to
extend aid or protection to fellow workers.
A work-related statutory right is not in essence an individual right; instead it is a
right shared by and created for employees as a group through the legislative process at
the Federal or state level.
Id. at 499, 501 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 500, 502 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). The dissent discussed the Su-
preme Court's approval of Board-created presumptions in Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), and concluded that the Alleluia Cushion presumption was valid
under Republic Aviation standards.
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tivity, such as an individual employee asserting a statutorily pro-
tected right, and concluded that both activities opposed the em-
ployer's economic power, affected all the employees, and deserved
the protection of section 7.16" Similarly, the dissent implied that
the construction of the term "concerted activities" should not op-
erate to restrict, but rather to "expand[ ] preexisting employee
rights concerning the workplace. 166 The dissent tempered its argu-
ment by pointing out that a finding of concerted activity under the
Alleluia Cushion doctrine does not resolve an 8(a)(1) case. Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Alleluia Cushion presumption shifts the
burden of proof to the employer to demonstrate that other em-
ployees disaffirmed the individual employee's actions or that the
individual employee acted solely in his own interest.167 The dis-
sent, in conclusion, argued that under the Alleluia Cushion doc-
trine the Board should have held that the employee's refusal to
drive the unsafe truck was constructive concerted activity under
section 7 of the NLRA."'6
The D.C. Circuit in Prill v. NLRB recently reversed Meyers
Industries and remanded the case for the Board's reconsidera-
tion.169 The D.C. Circuit gave two reasons for the reversal. First,
the court held that the Board made an erroneous legal conclusion
when it decided that the NLRA mandated the Board's new defini-
tion of "concerted activities.'1 70 Specifically, the court asserted
165. 268 N.L.R.B. at 501-02 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
166. Id. at 501.
167. Id. at 503 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). Earlier in his dissent, Member
Zimmerman had noted that, in Alleluia Cushion, the "nature and extent" of the employee's
OSHA complaints indicated that his concern was for the safety of other employees as well
as his own. Id. at 500; see also supra note 73. The dissent cited Comet Fast Freight, Inc.,
262 N.L.R.B. 430 (1982) (2-1 decision), for an example of an individual employee acting
solely in his own interest. In Comet the Board held not concerted an individual employee's
refusal to drive a truck he believed to be unsafe because the employee admitted in his pre-
trial affidavit that "'I was looking out for myself, not the other drivers. The other drivers
didn't mind driving the red truck like I did.'" 262 N.L.R.B. at 430 (footnote omitted).
While there is merit in drawing a distinction between employees who act solely on their own
behalf and those who act on behalf of their fellow employees as well, very few cases likely
will be as clear-cut as either Alleluia Cushion or Comet Fast Freight. Consequently, under
this analysis the determination of whether the employee acted solely on his own behalf
would be critical to the outcome of the case and, unfortunately, not readily discernible from
the facts.
168. 268 N.L.R.B. at 503 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
169. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (2-1 decision), rev'g Meyers Indus.,
Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (3-1 decision).
170. 755 F.2d at 942, 948. The court explained: "[T]he Board's opinion is wrong inso-
far as it holds that the agency is without discretion to construe 'concerted activities' except
as indicated in the Meyers test .... We express no view on whether, under § 7, the Board
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that the Supreme Court's decision and analysis in City Disposal
clearly indicates that neither the language nor history of the
NLRA mandates the Meyers Industries "concerted activities"
test.171 Second, the D.C. Circuit held that the NLRB misinter-
preted the law when it declared that the Meyers Industries test
was merely a return to the Board's pre-Alleluia Cushion "con-
certed activities" standard. 172 The court found the Board's new
test to be more restrictive than the standard applied before Alle-
luia Cushion, in part because the Meyers Industries test requires
that a group of employees authorize an individual assertion of a
group complaint for the complaint to be "concerted activity.'
73
Further, the court noted that the narrow Meyers Industries stan-
dard might not protect an individual employee's attempts to in-
duce group action.174 Thus, the court concluded that the Board's
decision in Meyers Industries stood "on a faulty legal premise and
may adopt the Meyers test as an exercise of discretion." Id. at 948 & n.46.
The court reversed and remanded the case under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943), which states that an agency's order may not stand "if the agency has misconceived
the law." Id. at 947 (quoting Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94).
171. 755 F.2d at 948, 951-53. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of the Interboro doctrine in light of the language,
history, and objectives of the NLRA.
The court pointed out that the Board decided Meyers Industries before the Supreme
Court handed down the City Disposal decision. 755 F.2d at 953. Accordingly, the court
noted that the remand will allow the Board to reconsider the constructive "concerted activi-
ties" question in light of City Disposal. Id.
172. 755 F.2d at 948, 953, 956. The court treated the Board's "misreading of prece-
dent" as a Chenery misconception of the law. Id. at 953; see also supra note 169 (discussing
Chenery).
173. 755 F.2d at 954. The court noted that the Meyers Industries test adopted lan-
guage identical to that found in Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310 (9th Cir.
1966), a one paragraph, per curiam opinion without citations. The court expressed the opin-
ion that the Meyers Industries test was similar to but more narrow than the Sixth Circuit's
ARO test. Id. at 954 n.75. This Recent Development likewise has observed that the Meyers
Industries test is essentially the same test that the Sixth Circuit adopted in Guernsey-
Muskingum, which constitutes the first prong of the ARO two-prong test. See supra note
154 and accompanying text.
The court noted that "[t]he Board's decisions since Meyers indicate that the new defi-
nition will be strictly construed to include only activity clearly joined in or endorsed by
other employees. . . . [T]he Board in effect will require that the complaint have been spe-
cifically authorized by other employees." 755 F.2d 948-49 (citing Mannington Mills, Inc., 272
N.L.R.B. No. 15, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,714 (Sept. 21, 1984)). The Court noted
also that the Board's decision in Jefferson Elec. Co., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 1984-85 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) 1 16,630 (Aug. 21, 1984), indicated that an individual employee's filing of a
safety complaint with a governmental agency will not be deemed "concerted" even though
other employees share the complaint. 755 F.2d at 949 & n.49.
174. 755 F.2d at 955 & n.83.
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without adequate rationale.' 175
The dissent in Prill v. NLRB would have upheld both the
Board's decision and the new standard the Board adopted in Mey-
ers Industries.76 The dissent argued that the court should have
upheld the Board's Meyers Industries decision because the
Board's new construction of section 7 was "altogether reasona-
ble.' ' 77 The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusions that
the Board wrongly defined the scope of the law and the Board's
own precedent. The dissent stated that the Board did not hold ex-
pressly or implicitly that it was required to define "concerted ac-
tivities" as it did in Meyers Industries.7 s The dissent found that
the Board did return, as it had claimed, to a pre-Alleluia Cushion
standard, not to a more narrow test. The dissent stated that the
Meyers Industries standard was not "exhaustive" and could be
modified to handle the different factual situations that arise in
constructive concerted activities cases. 7 9 Further, the dissent ar-
gued that the court should not reverse and remand Meyers Indus-
tries even if the Board had made an erroneous legal conclusion be-
cause such an error would not have been prejudicial. 80
175. Id. at 942, 948. The court characterized the Board's opinion in Meyers Industries
as "devoted primarily to criticizing Alleluia as inconsistent with the Act and contain[ing]
not a word of justification for its new standard in terms of the policies of the statute." Id. at
950. Thus, the court stated that, even if the Board had not made any erroneous legal conclu-
sions, it would still have had to remand the case under Chenery because the Board did not
provide an adequate rationale for the new standard adopted. Id.
176. Id. at 958 (Bork, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 959 (Bork, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that City Disposal neither
controlled the case nor supported the majority's position because City Disposal governed
only collective bargaining agreement contexts. Id.
178. Id. at 962 (Bork, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 963-65 (Bork, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Board would not
always construe the Meyers Industries test as narrowly as possible. Id. at 963.
180. The dissent argued that "[o]n the facts as we must take them, there is ... no
definition the Board could propose that would, consistently with the language of section 7,
afford petitioner relief. . .[because] there is no finding here that [the employee's] conduct
was in any way related to group activity." Id.
The majority disagreed with the dissent's position that the Board's "error" did not af-
fect the result of the case, arguing instead that:
[T]he result in a given case will often turn not only on the governing standard but also
on the manner in which the standard is applied, and this may well be influenced by
whether the Board believes the standard to be dictated by the statute itself or rather
adopted as a matter of policy in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Id. at 956-57 (majority's opinion).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Application of the City Disposal and Meyers Industries
Doctrines
Theoretically, the reach of the constructive concerted activi-
ties doctrine may extend to any individual employee activity that
would be concerted if more than one employee engaged in that ac-
tivity.18 1 Most constructive concerted activity cases, however, have
concerned either individual employee complaints or refusals to
work.' 82 Likewise, the motivation for employee activities that the
constructive concerted activities doctrine covers may include any
legitimate concern relating to the employment relationship.'8 3 In
practice, however, individual employee complaints have addressed
job safety,18 4 compensation,'8 5 and, to a lesser extent, other pri-
mary terms and conditions of employment.'
8 6
181. The activities, of course, must not be unlawful, insubordinate, or disloyal; § 7
would not protect these activities even if they were "concerted." See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
182. Both Interboro and Alleluia Cushion concerned employee complaints, and both
City Disposal and Meyers Industries concerned employee complaints combined with refus-
als to work.
183. See Note, supra note 162, at 1008 (concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection" means "all acts reasonably related to the employees' jobs or to their status as
employees . . . activity directed at wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment
.") (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984) (5-4 decision)
(complaint and refusal to drive allegedly unsafe truck); American Freight Sys., Inc. v.
NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (refusal to drive a truck believed to be unsafe); Meyers
Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (3-1 decision) (complaint and refusal to drive a truck
alleged to be unsafe); Pink Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 39 (1978) (complaint about unsafe
trucks and refusal to drive truck with allegedly defective brakes).
185. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980) (com-
plaint to union about overtime pay dispute with employer); Tri-State Truck Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 616 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision) (refusal to work on weekends without time
and a half overtime pay); Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977) (2-1 decision) (inquiry
whether employer had sufficient funds to meet upcoming payroll distribution); Diagnostic
Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1977) (complaint about employer's failure to grant
10% wage increase).
186. See, e.g., Koch Supplies, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (complaint
to management about vacation policies); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217
(8th Cir. 1970) (complaint about employer's denial of alleged seniority rights); Mushroom
Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964) (complaint to and discussion with fellow
employees about employer's vacation, work assignment, and holiday pay policies); General
Teamsters Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978) (grievance protesting employer's
failure to put employee's name on seniority list).
A number of constructive concerted activities cases have addressed individual employee
requests for union or fellow employee representation at employer-conducted meetings. See,
e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984)
(per curiam); E.I. de Pont de Nemours and Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983);
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Employee activities potentially invoking either of the con-
structive concerted activity doctrines may arise in eight general
contexts of workplace governance: (1) a union context in which
there is an applicable collective bargaining agreement provision
and an applicable statute covering the individual employee's ac-
tion; (2) a union context in which there is an applicable collective
bargaining provision but no applicable statute; (3) a union context
in which there is a collective bargaining agreement not containing
an applicable provision and an applicable statute; (4) a union con-
text in which there is a collective bargaining agreement but neither
an applicable provision nor an applicable statute; (5) a union con-
text in which there is no operative collective bargaining agreement
but an applicable statute; (6) a union context in which there is
neither an extant collective bargaining agreement nor an applica-
ble statute; (7) a nonunion context in which there is an applicable
statutory provision; and (8) a nonunion context in which there is
no applicable statute.
To understand the practical import of City Disposal and Mey-
ers Industries, consideration of a hypothetical case, typical of ac-
tual constructive concerted activity cases, and the probable out-
come of the case under current analysis in these eight contexts
would be helpful. Assume that an individual employee complains
to his employer and refuses to transport toxic wastes to a dump
site without protective safety equipment. The employer then dis-
charges the employee for making the complaint and for his refusal
to transport the toxic waste. The employee then files a section
8(a)(1) charge against the employer. The outcome of the case
would depend upon in which of the eight possible contexts the case
Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980); Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB,
580 F.2d 328 (8th Cir. 1978). Although the same basic constructive concerted activities anal-
ysis applies in these cases, a specific body of law particular to these cases has developed. See
NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (5-3 decision) (union employees entitled to
representation at an interview that the employer reasonably believes will result in discipli-
nary action); see also supra note 54 (discussing the effect of Weingarten on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's treatment of the Interboro doctrine). But see Sears, Roebuck and Co., 274 N.L.R.B.
No. 55, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,039 (Feb. 22, 1985) (refusing to extend Weingarten
rights to nonunionized employees). See generally "Concerted Activities" Under Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act-A Nonunion Employee Has a Right to the Presence of
a Co-Worker Witness at an Investigatory Interview Where the Employee Reasonably Be-
lieves That Discipline Will Result (E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v.
NLRB (3d Cir. 1983)), 29 VML L. REv. 987 (1983-84) (discussing the Third Circuit's treat-
ment of the issue in Chestnut Run). This Recent Development, accordingly, does not pur-
port to analyze thoroughly the problems associated with individual employee requests for
representation at investigating interviews.
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arose. Under current analysis, the employee's action would be
"concerted" in only two of the eight contexts-numbers one and
two. If the employer's company were unionized, a collective bar-
gaining agreement were in effect, and the agreement contained a
provision prohibiting the employer from requiring employees to
transport toxic substances without safety equipment, then the em-
ployee's discharge would violate section 8(a)(1) regardless of the
existence of a statutory provision. In none of the remaining six
contexts would the employee's activities be "concerted." Thus,
under the current analysis of individual concerted activity, which
consists of City Disposal and Meyers Industries, the determina-
tion of concertedness turns critically upon the existence of an ap-
plicable collective bargaining agreement provision. Subsequent sec-
tions of this part IV will explore the ramifications of this disparity
and suggest that in at least three of the remaining six workplace
contexts, the Board and the courts should consider the employee's
activities to be "concerted."
B. Impact of Current "Concerted Activities" Analysis on Labor
Dispute Resolution
The divergent "concerted activities" analyses of City Disposal
and Meyers Industries may have a negative effect on harmonious
labor relations and an overall effect of increasing the volume of
labor litigation originating in the district courts and, therefore,
outside the influence of the NLRB. Specifically, the divergent na-
ture of the two opinions is likely to affect section 8(a)(1) charges;
suits brought under section 301 of the Act;187 complaints filed
under occupational health and safety, equal employment opportu-
nity, workers compensation, and other employment-related stat-
utes; suits concerning section 502 of the Act;188 grievance arbitra-
tion procedures; and negotiation and content of collective
bargaining agreements.
187. Section 301(a) of the NLRA provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
188. Section 502 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall the quitting of
labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous condi-
tions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a
strike under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982).
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The composition, if not the number, of section 8(a)(1) charges
filed is likely to change. Because City Disposal deems concerted an
individual employee's honest and reasonable assertion of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement right,18 9 the number of section 8(a)(1)
complaints charging the employer with the violation or denial of
collective bargaining agreement rights is likely to increase. 90 On
the other hand, because the Meyers Industries decision denies
"concerted" status to individual employee assertions of statutory
rights, the number of section 8(a)(1) cases alleging employer retri-
bution for an employee's filing of a statutory charge or complaint is
likely to decline.
The number of suits brought under NLRA section 301 is likely
to increase as a result of the Board's restrictive definition of con-
certedness in Meyers Industries. Section 301 provides statutory
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district courts for cases in
which a party has alleged a breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.191 Courts firmly have established that an employee can bring
suit in federal district court under section 301 even if the alleged
breach of a collective bargaining agreement also constitutes a sec-
tion 8 unfair labor practice. 192 An employee, however, must ex-
haust all exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures the extant
collective bargaining agreement establishes before bringing suit
under section 301.193 Thus, a union employee discharged for assert-
ing a right that the collective bargaining agreement does not ex-
pressly secure could bring an action under section 301 in federal
189. See City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1984).
190. The dissent in City Disposal predicted and criticized this result. Id. at 1517
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (discussion of
dissent's view).
191. 9 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). For the full text of § 301(a), see supra note 187. See also
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
192. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1967); see also Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Peltzman v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.
1974) (per curiam).
193. See, e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981); Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
An employee is not required to exhaust all internal union appeal procedures before
filing suit under § 301, as long as those procedures cannot afford the complete relief sought
in the § 301 action. Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 695 (1981) (5-4 decision) ("The prefera-
ble approach is for the court to permit the employee's § 301 action to proceed. . . ,despite
the employee's failure to exhaust [internal union appeals procedures], unless the internal
union procedures can reactivate the grievance or grant the relief that would be available in
the employee's § 301 suit .... ).
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district court for breach of that agreement, if the employee first
has exhausted all available grievance arbitration procedures under
the collective bargaining agreement. This provision would allow an
individual employee to seek damages and reinstatement"' for an
alleged wrongful discharge even though such a claim is not availa-
ble under section 8(a)(1) because the employee's activity is not
"concerted" under either City Disposal or Meyers Industries.
A number of drawbacks exist to this alternative course of ac-
tion. First, bringing suit before a federal district court necessitates
foregoing the benefits of the NLRB's expertise. Second, proceed-
ings in a federal district court may take longer than NLRB pro-
ceedings. Last, section 301 suits, by definition, are not available to
employees in a no collective bargaining agreement context.195 Some
of the cases that union employees previously would have brought
before the Board as section 8(a)(1) charges, but now would fail
under Meyers Industries for lack of "concertedness," nevertheless
could appear in the future as section 301 suits in the federal dis-
trict courts.
The primary impact of the Meyers Industries ruling should be
a decline in the number of complaints employees file against their
employers under occupational health and safety, equal opportu-
nity, and workers compensation statutes. Without the protection
of the Alleluia Cushion doctrine, an individual employee fired for
194. If an employer wrongfully discharges an employee in violation of § 8(a)(1), the
NLRB is empowered to order the reinstatement of the employee with backpay. Section
10(c) of the NLRA provides in pertinent part:
If... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall...
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action includ-
ing reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the poli-
cies of this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 10(c) further provides that "[n]o order
of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been
suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was
suspended or discharged for cause." Id. Thus, the Board cannot require reinstatement of an
employee discharged for engaging in an activity the Act does not protect.
Similarly, § 301 empowers federal district courts to order either damages or reinstate-
ment. Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit has argued
that reinstatement should be the preferred remedy and that federal courts should award
damages only in cases when reinstatement is not practicable. Id. But cf. Soto Segarra v. Sea-
Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir. 1978) (reinstatement is a less preferred "alter-
native remedy" because it is a "more drastic remedy" than damages).
195. These employees would fall in one of workplace contexts (5)-(8). See supra text
following note 174. If union employees invoke § 301 more frequently, by analogy nonunion
employees could turn to common-law wrongful discharge actions.
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filing a workers compensation, discrimination, or occupational
safety complaint has no recourse beyond the institution of a com-
mon-law wrongful discharge action.'96 Employees who are aware of
their rights will think twice before filing a complaint against their
employer, and employees who are unaware of their vulnerability
under the Meyers Industries standard will be more likely to face
discharge or other disciplinary action than they would have under
Alleluia Cushion. These results tend naturally to hinder both the
intended prophylactic and remedial purposes of employment-re-
lated legislation. 1'
196. If an employer discharges an employee for filing an Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) claim, the employee also has the option of filing a complaint under
§ 11(c) of the OSHA, which provides in pertinent part:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or
others of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982).
Section 660(c)(2) provides for a 30-day statute of limitations, which is significantly
shorter than the 6-month statute of limitations established for unfair labor practice com-
plaints. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982); see Comment, Individual Safety Protests in the
Nonunion Workplace: Hazardous Decisions Under Hazardous Conditions, 89 Dc L. REV.
207, 227-30 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Decisions]. If, upon investigation of the
employee's complaint, the Secretary of Labor finds that the employer has violated this pro-
vision, the Secretary "shall" file a suit against the employer in federal district court; the
district courts have jurisdiction in such cases to order reinstatement with backpay. OSHA,
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1982). See generally Comment, A Right Under OSHA to Refuse Un-
safe Work or a Hobson's Choice of Safety or Job?, 8 U. BALT. L. RE v. 519 (1979) (examining
the right to refuse unsafe work under OSHA and the differences between OSHA and the
NLRA).
197. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 declares its purpose as follows:
"to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). The proposed means of achieving these ends
indicate the importance of employee participation:
(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their place of employment... ;
(2) by providing that employers and employees have separate but dependent responsi-
bilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and healthful working conditions;
(12) by providing for appropriate reporting procedures with respect to occupational
safety and health which procedures will help achieve the objectives of this chapter
29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the OSHA makes express provi-
sion for inspection requests by "[a]ny employees or representative of employees." 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(f)(1) (1982).
Similarly, the enforcement provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act
center around "charge[s] ... filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved...
alleging that an employer ... has engaged in unlawful employment practices ...... 42
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The number of suits brought under NLRA section 502 may
increase as a result of Meyers Industries. Section 502 provides
some degree of protection for an individual employee or group of
employees who refuse to work in "abnormally dangerous" working
conditions. 198 Section 502 provides that an employee's refusal to
work in "abnormally dangerous" conditions shall not constitute a
strike. Thus, an employer discharging an employee who refuses to
work in abnormally unsafe conditions cannot avoid an unfair labor
practice violation by invoking a no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement.19 Section 502, however, would not necessa-
rily grant employees the general right to refuse to work in unsafe
conditions in the absence of a no-strike clause, or in the absence of
a collective bargaining agreement. Employees who are not under
the benefit of a collective bargaining agreement "safety" provi-
sion 20 and are discharged for refusing to work in allegedly danger-
ous conditions increasingly will urge the Board and the courts to
interpret section 502 to grant employees an affirmative right,
rather than merely to protect employees from an employer's de-
fense. No Board decision subsequent to Meyers Industries, how-
ever, has held an individual employee's refusal to work in unsafe
conditions protected under section 502 after denying protection
under section 7.2°1
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982). For the relevant portion of the text of § 502, see supra
note 188.
199. See NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 759 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
200. These employees would fall in one of workplace contexts (3)-(8). See supra text
following note 174.
201. In Meyers Industries the Board did not address the question of whether § 502
would apply. 268 N.L.R.B. at 493 n.1 (1984), rev'd sub. nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The General Counsel had moved to amend its complaint to include the
allegation that § 502 supported the contention that Meyers had wrongfully discharged the
employee for refusing to drive an unsafe truck. The ALJ and the Board denied the General
Counsel's motion to amend on grounds that the General Counsel had not raised or litigated
the § 502 issue at the hearing before the ALJ. Id. In one Board case decided after Meyers
the Board disagreed with the AI's finding that § 502 protected an employee's refusal to
perform a rustproofing assignment without safety equipment. See Goodyear Tire and Rub-
ber Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 881 (1984). The Board asserted: "It is well settled that Section 502
applies only where it has been objectively established that the working conditions are ab-
normally dangerous." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Gibralter Steel
Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,167 (Dec. 14, 1984) (General
Counsel failed to prove that individual, unconcerted activity fell within § 502); Southwire
Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,899 (Nov. 23, 1984) (rejecting a
§ 502 argument because the employee "did not refuse to perform work because he believed
an abnormally dangerous condition existed ... [but] because his fear of heights prevented
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As the dissent argued in City Disposal, the decision to affirm
the Interboro doctrine may lessen the importance and usefulness
of the grievance arbitration processes 0 2 and, therefore, of griev-
ance and arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 03
Before City Disposal an assertion of a collective right could not, in
and of itself, sustain an unfair labor practice charge in courts not
accepting the Interboro doctrine.0 4 Today, an individual em-
ployee's honest and reasonable assertion of a collective bargaining
agreement right, construed in light of City Disposal, is sufficient to
support a section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice complaint.20 5 Em-
ployees who have been discharged or otherwise disciplined for as-
serting a right contained in the collective bargaining agreement
now may choose either to bypass the grievance arbitration mecha-
nism entirely and file a section 8(a)(1) charge or to file a complaint
with the NLRB after an unfavorable grievance arbitration out-
come. Because the Board has the power to defer to a grievance
arbitration process,20 6 however, an employee taking either of these
routes risks Board deferral to the grievance arbitration system that
the collective bargaining agreement has established.
In Interboro and City Disposal neither the Board nor the
courts enforcing the Board's order deferred to the results of the
grievance or arbitration proceedings.0 7 In two recent decisions,
however, the Board has reestablished broad deferral policies to ar-
bitration awards 2 8 and prearbitral dispute resolution.209 Certainly,
him from performing the task.").
202. 104 S. Ct. at 1517-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing City Disposal's potential
impact on collective bargaining and substantive collective bargaining provisions).
204. See City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra note 131.
205. See 104 S. Ct. at 1516 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent found this aspect of
the Interboro doctrine particularly worrisome. Id. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
206. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (Board deferral of prearbi-
tral disputes); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (Board deferral to arbitration
awards).
207. In Interboro the parties did not arbitrate the dispute; the Board actually skirted
the issue by declaring that the employee complaints were grievances. 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298.
In City Disposal the Court noted that the union declined to process the grievance the em-
ployee filed after his discharge because the grievance lacked "objective merit." 104 S. Ct. at
1509. The Court, however, never discussed this fact.
208. The Board recently returned to its practice of deferring to "adequately consid-
ered" arbitration awards that it originally announced in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955). See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (3-1 decision) ("[A]n arbitrator
has adequately considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually
parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally
with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice."); see also Altoona Hosp., 270
1334 [Vol. 38:1295
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an employee who loses his grievance protesting an Interboro-type
discharge has nothing to lose by filing a section 8(a)(1) charge.
Thus, City Disposal may pose a further challenge to the strength
of the grievance arbitration process and raise additional questions
about the degree of deference the Board should pay to collective
bargaining agreement grievance arbitration procedures and their
outcomes. An unresolved tension, therefore, has developed between
the City Disposal holding and the Board's signaled return to a
broad deferral to arbitrated and prearbitral dispute resolutions.
210
City Disposal also is likely to affect both the negotiation and
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements. In light
of City Disposal's acceptance of the Interboro doctrine, the union
will want to have as many clauses as possible enumerating specific
employee rights and employer responsibilities in the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Conversely, and perhaps even more impor-
tantly, employers are motivated not to agree to provisions granting
specific contractual rights to the employees in the collective bar-
gaining agreement because now an individual employee as well as a
group of employees can invoke and attempt to enforce the provi-
sions. Although these types of conflicting objectives are not new,
much more is now at stake. Because most of the substantive dis-
putes underlying Interboro-type discharges have been the subjects
of mandatory collective bargaining, 11 at least the potential exists
for increased conflict at the bargaining tables.
N.L.R.B. No.179, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,440, at 28,110 (1984) (applying Olin stan-
dard and deferring to arbitrator's judgment). In Olin the Board stressed the importance of
arbitration in the resolution of labor disputes and advocated a high degree of deferral to
arbitration awards. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
209. In a recent decision the Board also resurrected Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), and reinstated an unadulterated policy of deferral to prearbitral dis-
pute resolution, including § 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) cases. United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (3-1 decision).
210. If, as in City Disposal, the Board fails to defer to an existing grievance arbitra-
tion mechanism in future constructive concerted activities cases, the Board will be under-
cutting its Olin-United Technologies deferral standards. On the other hand, if the Board
implements its Olin-United Technologies standards, the Board will have limited the practi-
cal effect of City Disposal. But see Note, supra note 38, at 93-94.
211. Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes on the employer and the union a duty to
bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1982). The subjects most often underlying constructive concerted activities
cases-job safety and compensation-clearly fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining.
See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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C. Shortcomings of the Current Doctrines
The Supreme Court's analysis and decision in City Disposal
contains no fatal errors. The Interboro constructive concerted ac-
tivities doctrine, although a legal fiction, is a reasonable construc-
tion of section 7. Although both the language and history of section
7 of the NLRA support the conclusion that the Act intended to
foster collective, not individual action,212 the judicial history of
American labor law, and, indeed, American law in general, is re-
plete with generous statutory interpretations. The Board and the
courts should construe the provisions of the Act in a way that will
effectuate as nearly as possible the Act's purposes. 213 For the most
part, City Disposal has accomplished that task. By protecting in-
dividual action, however, City Disposal encourages individual em-
ployees to act on their own even when the presence of a union and
a collective bargaining agreement makes collective action readily
accessible and, indeed, preferable. Thus, the principal problem
with City Disposal is its potential to undercut collective activity in
general and, specifically, the grievance arbitration mechanism.
214
Meyers Industries, on the other hand, is more objectionable
and potentially more prodigious than City Disposal.215 Meyers In-
212. See Note, supra note 27, at 370-71, 376-77 (1983); Note, supra note 162, at 993.
213. See supra note 2. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he best interests of
labor would be served if the legislature deleted the requirement of 'concerted activity' from
section 7." Comment, supra note 38, at 174.
214. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
215. The Board has relied on Interboro only a few times since the Supreme Court
approved the Interboro doctrine in City Disposal. See ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 271 N.L.R.B.
No. 6, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 16,510 (June 29, 1984) (employee refusal to drive an
allegedly unsafe truck not concerted under the Interboro doctrine because the employee's
invocation of his collective bargaining agreement right was not "reasonable and honest");
Vanport Sand and Gravel, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 205, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,487
(June 25, 1984) (employer unlawfully discharged an employee for filing a grievance pro-
testing infringement of collective bargaining agreement seniority rights); Jersey Central
Power & Light Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 886 (1984) (employer unlawfully discharged an employee
for intending to file a grievance asserting right to compensation that the collective bargain-
ing agreement secured).
Since overturning the Alleluia Cushion doctrine, the Board has invoked the Meyers
Industries standard many times. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 15,
1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,714 (Sept. 21, 1984) (employee representative to company's
safety committee was not engaged in "concerted activity" as defined in Meyers Industries
when he told the foreman that the employees would no longer finish the previous shift's
loading operations because, although this was a "long-standing complaint," other employees
had not authorized the representative to make such a threat); Jefferson Elec. Co., 271
N.L.R.B. No. 177, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,630 (Aug. 21, 1984) (employee's filing of
state OSHA complaint held not concerted under Meyers Industries because, although other
employees had voiced the same safety complaint to management, the discharged employee
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dustries, unlike City Disposal, applies to all employees regardless
of whether they are unionized, governed by a collective bargaining
agreement, or protected by statutorily granted rights. The Board is
likely to apply the rule set forth in Meyers Industries to all indi-
vidual concerted activity cases as the first step in its analysis, and
to apply the Interboro doctrine only when there is a relevant col-
lective bargaining agreement provision. The rule laid down in City
Disposal is now but an exception to the general rule set forth in
had not solicited their support); Schreiber Materials and Cartage Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1457
(1984) (union employee's filing and refusing to retract workers compensation claim not
"concerted" under the Meyers Industries standard); Alcan Cable, 269 N.L.R.B. 184 (1984)
(neither employee's workers compensation claim nor complaint filed pursuant to employer's
internal complaint procedure constituted "concerted activities"); Spartan Plastics, Inc., 269
N.L.R.B. 546 (1984) (conferral and collaboration of fellow employees sufficient under Mey-
ers Industries standard to make employee's complaint questionnaire a concerted activity);
Briley Marine, 269 N.L.R.B. 697 (1984) (employee's filing of workers compensation claim
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), not concerted activity under Meyers Industries
doctrine); Harris Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 733 (1984) (employee's letter of complaint to employer
regarding wages and working conditions held concerted under Meyers Industries because
fellow employees participated in the employee's complaint by making suggestions about the
content and language of the letter); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 881 (1984)
(employee refusal to perform rustproofing job without safety equipment held not concerted
under the Meyers Industries standard); Wabco Constr. and Mining Equip. Group, 270
N.L.R.B. No. 126, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) $ 16,421 (1984) (employee's filing of workers
compensation claim not concerted activity); United Pac. Reliance Ins., Inc., 270 N.L.R.B.
No. 142, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,389 (1984) (employee's lottery to protest em-
ployer's wage policies held a purely personal protest and, thus, not concerted under Meyers
Industries); Bearden and Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) % 16,798
(Oct. 25, 1984) (employer's refusal to recall the employee not unlawful because employee's
filing claim for unemployment compensation during layoff not concerted activity under the
Meyers Industries standard).
The Board has continued to apply its Meyers Industries test even after the D.C. Circuit
reversed and remanded the Board's Meyers Industries decision. See, e.g., John H. Cooney,
Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 88, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] NLRB Dec. (CCH) I 17,327 (May 31,
1985) ("In general, to find an employee's activity to be 'concerted,' we shall require that it
be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf
of the employee himself."); Herrick & Smith, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1144 (May 14, 1985) (meeting not concerted under Meyers Industries because "its real teeth
involved individual complaints made on an individual basis"); Spencer Trucking Corp., 274
N.L.R.B. No. 206, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1085 (Mar. 29, 11985) (individual employee's request
for pink slip to demonstrate support for discharged fellow employees concerted under Mey-
ers Industries); Rayglo Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. No.157, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] NLRB Dec.
(CCH) I 17,173 (Mar. 19, 1985) (group of employees' refusal to work concerted under Mey-
ers Industries); Advance Cleaning Serv., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 141, [1985-86 Transfer Binder]
NLRB Dec. (CCH) I 17,395 (Mar. 13, 1985) (group of employees' refusal to work overtime
concerted under Meyers Industries); SECO Elec. Co., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 1984-85 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) I 17,147 (Mar. 7, 1985) (employee's complaint to state agency over employer's
alleged failure to pay prevailing wage rate not concerted under Meyers Industries); United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) I 17,131 (Feb. 28, 1985)
(employee's refusal to honk truck horn at delivery sites in residential areas because he
thought it violated the law not concerted under Meyers Industries).
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Meyers Industries, which is not only historically pre-Alleluia
Cushion but also pre-Interboro.21 6 Further, the most disturbing as-
pect of the Meyers Industries decision is its condonation of em-
ployers who discharge employees for filing occupational health and
safety complaints, 21 7 unemployment compensation claims,21 8 and
workers compensation claims.21 9
216. Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496-97. See supra notes 48-51, 154, 173 and
accompanying text for discussion of the historical roots of the Meyers Industries standard
in NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960); for the
language drawn from Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1966); for the
first prong of the test in ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979); and for the
relationship between the Meyers Industries test and the standard advocated by Justice
O'Connor in her City Disposal dissent.
217. See Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 476 (1983) (2-1 decision), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1984). The Board, in a pre-
Meyers Industries decision, held that an employer's refusal to recall from layoff a union
employee who had filed a request for inspection under the OSHA was not a § 8(a)(1) viola-
tion. The Board based its ruling on the grounds that the employee's complaint had not been
the cause of the discharge. The Second Circuit reversed, agreeing with the A.'s finding
that the employer refused to recall the employee because of his complaint, and remanded to
the Board for a determination whether Alleluia Cushion or Meyers Industries governed the
case. On remand, the Board decided to apply Meyers Industries, but found no violation of
§ 8(a)(1) because the employee's OSHA complaint was not with or on the authority of other
employees, and therefore not concerted activity within the Meyers Industries standard.
Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,904, at
29,025-26 (Dec. 14, 1984) (2-1 decision). The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case
again in light of the D.C. Circuit's reversal of Meyers Industries in Prill v. NLRB. Ewing v.
NLRB, 768 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the court noted that, unlike the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Prill, it was not reviewing "the original decision in Meyers, but only the Meyers rule
as it is applied to Ewing," id. at 55, it proceeded to "consider whether it is within the
Board's discretion to protect the rights of workers such as Ewing in light of City Disposal,"
id. In so doing, the court did not express any opinion regarding the proper interpretation of
"concerted activities," but directed the Board to reconsider its decision in light of Prill and
City Disposal, and to consider "whether Ewing's lay off for a supposed safety complaint had
a 'chilling effect' on the collective rights of other employees." Id. (citation omitted).
Interestingly, the Board is willing to find a § 8(a)(1) violation when an employer threat-
ens to retaliate against employees who jointly file complaints with OSHA, see Certified
Serv., Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. No.67, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,271 (Apr. 30, 1984), but not
when that same employer fires an individual employee for filing an OSHA complaint, id. at
27,815. The Board found that the employer's threatening remarks "would reasonably tend
to interfere with employees in the exercise of rights under the Act." Id. Arguably, the em-
ployer's dismissing an employee for filing a safety complaint could have the same chilling
effect on both individual and joint complaints.
For an analysis of the effect of the Board's decision in Meyers Industries on nonunion
employee rights to protest unsafe working conditions, see Hazardous Decisions, supra note
196 (arguing that Meyers Industries' removal of Alleluia Cushion protection coupled with
the limited protection of § 11(c) of the OSHA has left nonunion employees without reasona-
ble means of dealing with unsafe working conditions).
218. See Bearden and Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,798
(Oct. 25, 1984).
219. See, e.g., Schreiber Materials and Cartage Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 1457 (1984) (union
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Although each of these two recent decisions has its own de-
fects, the most worrisome problems may appear when the Board
and the courts read City Disposal and Meyers Industries together.
The two "concerted activities" analyses are inconsistent, both in
their analytical approach to section 7 and in their resulting out-
comes in individual concerted activity cases. Primarily because the
Board expanded the Alleluia Cushion doctrine in the cases leading
up to Meyers Industries, the Board's overruling of Alleluia Cush-
ion has a much greater impact now than it would have had soon
after the Board promulgated the Alleluia Cushion doctrine. 220 To
have overruled the original Alleluia Cushion doctrine would have
been to hold that an individual employee's assertion of a statutory
occupational safety right designed to protect all employees would
not constitute a concerted activity.221 Instead, under Meyers In-
dustries, to be concerted, an individual employee's activity cannot
be by and on behalf of himself alone, but instead must be with or
on behalf of fellow employees.222 This language is not only broad
and far-reaching, but also in direct contradiction to the analytical
framework of Interboro as approved by the Supreme Court.
Referring back to the hypothetical set forth in section A of
part IV,22s two otherwise identical employees transporting toxic
wastes without adequate safety equipment would be in two very
different situations under the current constructive concerted activ-
ities analysis. An employer could not lawfully discharge the em-
ployee protected by an applicable collective bargaining agreement
provision 22  for individually asserting his collective bargaining
agreement right honestly and reasonably. An employer could, on
the other hand, discharge the employee who individually asserts a
employee); Alcan Cable, 269 N.L.R.B. 184 (1984) (nonunion employee's state workers com-
pensation claim and employer's internal complaint procedure claim); Briley Marine, 269
N.L.R.B. 697 (1984) (workers compensation claim pursuant to Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1982)); Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 635 (1984).
220. Member Zimmerman, who dissented in Meyers Industries, raised this argument
in his dissent from a recent Board decision which held that an employer's refusal to recall
an employee from layoff because the employee filed an unemployment compensation claim
was not a violation of § 8(a)(1). Bearden and Co., 272 N.L.R.B. No.135, 1984-85 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) V 16,798, at 28,875 (Oct. 25, 1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) (arguing that,
by correcting the overextension of the Alleluia Cushion doctrine, the Board is "wrongfully
contracting the plain meaning of protected concerted activity.").
221. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Alleluia Cushion doctrine).
222. See supra text accompanying note 154.
223. See supra text following note 174.
224. This employee could be in either workplace context (1) or (2). See supra text
following note 174.
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statutory right honestly and reasonably when that employee is pro-
tected "only" by a federal statute22 5 prohibiting the carrying of
toxic wastes without adequate safety equipment. Because the sec-
ond employee does not have the benefit of an applicable collective
bargaining agreement right, the provisions of section 7 apply dif-
ferently to him than to the first employee. The employee lacking a
collective bargaining agreement right must either act with or on
behalf of other employees to secure "concerted" activity status.
This line-drawing is unacceptable in both analytical and practical
terms.
D. Proposal: A Unified Standard for Concerted Activities
In accordance with the objective of the NLRA, the concern in
all constructive concerted activity cases should be that the respec-
tive parties do not interfere "with the legitimate rights of the
other. 2 2' The constructive concerted activity doctrine should, to
the fullest extent possible, strike a balance between the competing
interests of employers and employees. Employers' primary con-
cerns are that employees will file spurious charges, complaints, and
grievances, and that the employer will be unable to discharge law-
fully an employee who harasses the employer with gripes and mer-
itless complaints. On the other hand, employees are concerned pri-
marily with securing the advantage of rights bargained for and
rights obtained through legislation and about losing their jobs as a
result of asserting those rights.
In light of the objectives of the NLRA, the equities of each
position, and what the Supreme Court has established as a reason-
able interpretation of section 7, the Board and the courts should
deem an individual employee's activity to be concerted when the
employee reasonably and in good faith asserts a right secured ei-
ther by an existing collective bargaining agreement or by an em-
225. This employee could be in any one of workplace contexts (3), (5), or (7). See
supra text following note 174.
226. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982); see also supra note 2. One commentator wisely has
recognized that an employer's retaliation against an employee for asserting his legal rights is
detrimental not only to the employee but also to the employer. See Johnson, supra note 8,
at 877 ("Retaliating against employees... will compound whatever grievance the employ-
ees have and may lead to more demonstrations of dissatisfaction .... [B]y suppressing the
rights of his employees, the employer may not only subject himself to legal liability but may
well endanger his coveted status as a non-union employer."). But see Note, supra note 162,
at 1014 ("Allowing employer retaliation against individuals may effectively diminish the
possibility of subsequent group activity.").
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ployment-related statute. 27 Further, in a union context, the Board
and the courts should require an employee, before filing an unfair
labor practice charge, to invoke the union's support and exhaust all
available grievance arbitration procedures unless the immediacy of
the situation or of the matter asserted justifies individual action.228
For example, in a union setting, an employee is much more war-
ranted in individually confronting a problem relating to safe work-
ing conditions than in embarking on a lone crusade to protest an
employer compensation, vacation, or work assignment policy. The
Board and the courts should not expect an employee faced with a
hazardous working condition to risk his health and safety first and
file a grievance later.22 An employee faced with an infringement of
his seniority rights, however, should seek redress through the
union and established grievance procedures. To hold otherwise
would diminish not only the role of the grievance arbitration insti-
tution, but also the union's historical function of enforcing collec-
tive bargaining agreements. An adverse ruling on an employee
grievance or at arbitration should not preclude the employee from
filing a section 8 charge. The Board and the Administrative Law
Judges, however, should follow the broad deferral standards set
forth in Olin and United Technologies.'"
This unified approach would combine the best features of the
City Disposal and Alleluia Cushion standards while alleviating the
problems of the arbitrary boundaries between concerted and un-
concerted activities that the separate Interboro and Meyers Indus-
tries standards now create.21' First, this unified approach would
227. Statutory rights merit the same degree of protection under § 7 as collective bar-
gaining agreement rights. To deny § 7 protection to individual assertions of employment
related statutory rights would hinder the effectuation of the policies and objectives that
other labor legislation has established. A constructive concerted activities doctrine that does
not apply to assertions of statutory rights also potentially deprives employees of the oppor-
tunity to assert basic rights, such as the right to a safe work place and the right to equal
employment opportunity. Furthermore, the invocation of a statutory right affecting all em-
ployees is at least as much for the purpose of mutual aid or protection as the invocation of a
collective bargaining agreement right.
228. See Note, supra note 38, at 93-94.
229. Under the present rules the employee faces a difficult choice, or as one commen-
tator has phrased it, "the dilemma of probable discharge or continued work under unsafe
conditions." Hazardous Decisions, supra note 196, at 230.
230. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. This "remedy-exhaustion limita-
tion," of course, would not apply in a nonunion setting, unless there were some type of
formal internal dispute resolution mechanism.
231. City Disposal was decided two months after Meyers Industries. Both the Su-
preme Court majority and the dissent in City Disposal took note of the earlier NLRB case
but made only limited comments on the discrepancy between the two decisions. See 104 S.
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satisfy the employee's legitimate interests. The approach would al-
low for a consistent interpretation of "concerted activities" cover-
ing individual employee rights that either a contract or statute
secures. This approach also would protect the individual employee
from retaliatory discharge for asserting or exercising either of those
rights. Section 7 "concerted activities" would have a uniform defi-
nition in union and nonunion settings. Under this uniform ap-
proach, both employees in the toxic waste hypothetical2 2 would
receive equal treatment under section 7.
Second, this unified approach would protect the employers' le-
gitimate interests. This unified standard would still allow an em-
ployer to discharge a malevolent employee who harasses the em-
ployer with spurious complaints. To merit section 7 protection 3
under this proposal for a unified City Disposal-Alleluia Cushion
standard, an employee complaint would have to be: (1) grounded
in a collective bargaining agreement or in a statute;234 (2) reasona-
ble and in good faith;23 5 (3) pursued in any applicable grievance or
arbitration forums;23 6 and (4) for the purpose of "mutual aid or
protection. ' 23 7 A bogus claim could not overcome all these hurdles
and attain protection under section 7.
The best, most effective means of establishing the proposed
analysis would be through an amendment to the NLRA. Specifi-
cally, legislative articulation of a section 7 right expressly protect-
Ct. at 1510 n.6 ("The Board ... distinguished [Meyers Industries] from the cases involving
the Interboro doctrine, which is based on the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement.
The Meyers case is thus of no relevance here."); id. at 1517 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The Court and the Board ... agree that the mere fact that an asserted right can be
presumed to be of interest to other employees is not a sufficient basis for labeling it
'concerted.' ").
232. See supra text following note 174.
233. This unified proposal would make no change in the past and current requirement
that § 7 protection will accrue only to concerted activities that are not violent, unlawful,
insubordinate, or otherwise unprotected. See supra notes 117, 127, 181 and accompanying
text.
234. This criterion would hold "concerted" individual employee activities in workplace
contexts (1)-(3), (5), and (7), but leave "unconcerted" activities in contexts (4), (6), and (8),
in which there is neither an applicable collective bargaining agreement provision nor a stat-
ute. See supra text following note 174.
235. This standard incorporates the majority holding in City Disposal. See supra note
121 and accompanying text.
236. This approach pays heed to the City Disposal dissent's and to the Board's recent
concern that appropriate deference be granted to the grievance arbitration process as a pre-
ferred forum, if available, for resolution of collective bargaining right disputes. See supra
notes 135-36, 206-10 and accompanying text.
237. In cases involving statutory rights, the "mutual aid or protection" ordinarily
could be inferred from the substantive nature of the statutory right asserted.
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ing individual assertions of collective bargaining agreement rights
and employment-related statutory rights would resolve the uncer-
tainty in this area285 and eliminate concern about tortuous inter-
pretations of the Act. No reason, however, exists to anticipate a
congressional response to City Disposal and Meyers Industries.
Congress has not amended the NLRA since enacting the Landrum-
Griffin Act in 1959, despite the need for resolution of these issues,
which have been the subject of NLRB and judicial consternation
for many years. In the absence of congressional clarification of
these questions, the Board and the courts should recognize and ap-
ply the proposed unified City Disposal-Alleluia Cushion analysis.
As an initial step, the Board, in its upcoming reconsideration of
the "concerted activities" definition, should abandon the Meyers
Industries standard, and extend section 7 coverage to individual
assertions of statutory rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and the NLRB have handed down deci-
sions recently that redefine constructive concerted activities. In
City Disposal the Supreme Court, by adopting the Interboro doc-
trine, resolved the split between the circuit courts on the issue
whether and in what circumstances individual activities can be
"concerted activities" under section 7 of the NLRA. Under the Su-
preme Court's ruling an individual's activity is concerted if it is an
honest and reasonable assertion of a right that a collective bargain-
ing agreement secures. In the absence of a collective bargaining
provision to buttress an employee's claim, the employee must act
with or on behalf of fellow employees. In Meyers Industries the
NLRB replaced the Alleluia Cushion doctrine with the rule that
an employee's assertion of an employment-related statutory right
is not "concerted." The Board held that an individual employee's
assertion of a statutory right, or any other claim that a collective
bargaining agreement does not secure, will be concerted only if the
employee acts with or on the authority of fellow employees. Taken
separately, the two decisions create serious problems. City Dispo-
sal threatens to undermine the grievance arbitration mechanism
by allowing some alleged collective bargaining agreement violations
238. The amendment could add an additional sentence to the end of § 7:
For purposes of this section, concerted activities shall include an individual employee's
reasonable and good faith assertion, made for the purpose of mutual aid or protection,
of a collective bargaining agreement right or employment-related statutory right.
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to support independently an unfair labor practice claim without
deferral to grievance arbitration procedures or awards. Meyers In-
dustries would expose employees not governed by a collective bar-
gaining agreement to the threat of employer retaliation against le-
gitimate assertions of employment-related statutory rights.
Furthermore, these two decisions, when read together as one
constructive concerted activities doctrine, draw arbitrary lines that
effect inequitable outcomes. All things being equal, an employee's
assertion of a right that a collective bargaining agreement secures
will constitute concerted activity, while another employee's asser-
tion of the same or similar right that only a statute secures will not
be concerted. Which of the two divergent constructive concerted
activities doctrines will apply hinges solely upon the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement provision. Thus, section 7 now ef-
fectively favors union employees over nonunion employees. Fur-
thermore, section 7 favors collective bargaining rights over statuto-
rily granted rights, because even a union employee is unable to
assert a statutory right that is not also the subject of a provision in
the collective agreement.
The best approach to determine whether an individual em-
ployee has engaged in concerted activity would be to reinstate the
Alleluia Cushion doctrine or to extend City Disposal to cover stat-
utory as well as collective bargaining agreement rights. A unified
City Disposal-Alleluia Cushion standard would effectuate more
nearly the purposes of the NLRA and other employment-related
legislation without creating the inconsistencies and inequities that
exist under the current analysis. An amendment to the NLRA ex-
pressly addressing and clarifying the questions that individual em-
ployee activity cases have raised would best remedy the inadequa-
cies of present doctrinal analysis. If Congress, however, continues
to leave these questions and ambiguities to judicial and adminis-
trative agency interpretation, the NLRB and the courts should im-
plement and apply consistently a uniform constructive concerted
activities definition, such as the proposed City Disposal-Alleluia
Cushion standard, and reject the current inconsistent analyses. In
the search for an ideal constructive concerted activities doctrine,
the Supreme Court has taken one step forward and the NLRB has
taken one step backward.
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